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A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF MODERN
EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP
Michael L. Seigel*
A recent survey of modem evidence scholarship produced a remark-
able discovery: the major intellectual movements characterizing legal
thought during the latter quarter of the twentieth century-including
critical legal studies ("cls") and practical legal studies ("pls")-have left
evidence scholarship virtually untouched.' The authors of modem evi-
dence scholarship have not confined their efforts to traditional doctrinal
exegesis, however. Instead, most have traveled down one of two non-
traditional paths: the "new evidence scholars" have studied the decision-
making processes of the jury from a theoretical and often mathematical
perspective, while many other evidence professors have focused their at-
tention on the application of social scientific research to evidence issues.2
* Associate Professor, University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Florida. A.B.,
Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I express my gratitude to Francis A. Allen, Ron-
ad J. Allen, Craig R. Callen, Charles W. Collier, Philip P. Frickey, Nancy J. King, Jeffrey E. Lewis,
Charles R. Nesson, Roger C. Park, Christopher Slobogin, J. Alexander Tanford, and Olin Guy
Wellborn III for their helpful comments regarding earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to
thank Roberta J. Tylke and Robert E. Bodnar, Jr. for their expert research assistance.
1 See Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849, 849-50 (1991).
2 Id. at 851-58; see also WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 69-70 (1990) (noting
three areas of development in evidence scholarship: inquiries into "the nature of probabilistic rea-
soning in forensic contexts," studies pertaining to law and psychology, and pursuit of "the new
rhetoric").
Professor Park's assessment of the present state of evidence scholarship leads him to lament the
decline of traditional doctrinal analysis. He attributes this decline to the bleak outlook for doctrinal
reform. See Park, supra note 1, at 869. Professor Park's pessimism about the efficacy of doctrinal
evidence scholarship has affected his own scholarly work; his most recent energies have been di-
rected toward empirical research. See Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation
of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 683 (1992); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions
ofEyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1992).
The prospect of doctrinal reform in the law of evidence has improved dramatically since Profes-
sor Park surveyed the evidence scene. Subsequent to his writing, a number of scholars and judges
argued that the cause of this doctrinal stagnation was the failure of the Supreme Court to establish
an advisory committee to oversee amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and they called for
the establishment of such a committee. See, eg., Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal
Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years--The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for
an Advisory Committee on the Rules ofEvidence, and Suggestionsfor Selective Revision ofthe Rules,
60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 857, 859-62, 909-14 (1992). The Supreme Court has heeded this call. See
Timothy B. Dyk & Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 17, 18 ("The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, which had been inac-
tive virtually since the passage of the rules in 1975, was resurrected in the fall of 1992.").
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The state of contemporary evidence scholarship can be traced to evi-
dence scholars' near-universal acceptance of "optimistic rationalism," 3
that is, the belief that the overarching function of evidence law is to max-
imize the (already fairly high) probability that factfinders in our adjudi-
catory system will accurately determine objective historical truth.4
Functioning as a shared ideology, rationalism has caused the evidence
community to suffer from what might be termed "collective myopia."
As a result of their rationalist 5 orientation to the processes of adjudica-
tion, evidence scholars have generally failed to see any application of
postmodern jurisprudential perspectives, such as cls or pls-or feminism
or critical race theory, for that matter-to their intellectual domain. In
this respect, evidence thought has been stagnant.6
This Article fits into the fairly nascent pls movement, 7 which finds
3 This term was coined by Professor Twining. See TWINING, supra note 2, at 75.
4 See id. at 71-82; see also infra part I.
5 I use the term "rationalist" throughout this article as a shorthand reference to the "rationalist
tradition" elucidated by Professor Twining. I am not referring to that term as it is used in philoso-
phy. See 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 69-75 (Paul Edwards et al. eds., 1967) (delineating the
various ways the term "rationalism" has been used in philosophy).
6 There is great significance to the qualification "in this respect" in this sentence. I do not mean
to suggest that evidence scholarship has produced nothing of value in recent years; quite the con-
trary. It goes without saying that, for generations, academicians have made a multitude of impor-
tant contributions to this field. (I forego citation of this point because noting the work of some
scholars would necessarily insult those not included on the list.) My critique is thus not intended as
a blanket denigration or condemnation of modem evidence scholarship. Rather, it is intended to
provoke evidence scholars into a self-conscious examination of their collective enterprise. If my
thesis is correct, such an examination would yield some positive results. I am hopeful that this
critique will be taken in that spirit.
Although the point should be obvious, it is also worth stating that I have not read all the
evidence scholarship written in recent times. I have read enough, however, to satisfy myself that my
general conclusions concerning modem evidence scholarship are accurate. I also rely on the conclu-
sions of others who have surveyed the field, such as Professors Park and Twining. See Park, supra
note I, at 849-50; TWINING, supra note 2, at 32-82.
7 The name "pls" was coined by Professor Jay Feinman in an essay critical of scholars who
have begun to explore applications of pragmatism and practical reason to legal questions. Professor
Feinman's view is that pls is merely a "liberal/moderate/conservative response to the radicalism of
Critical Legal Studies." Jay M. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87
MICH. L. REV. 724, 731 (1988). About the same time, Professor Edward Rubin identified what he
called the "Law as Practical Reason" movement. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse
of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1878-80 (1988). Given its relatively recent origins, it
is not surprising that this movement has yet to be identified by a single name. It is also not surpris-
ing that those characterizing their scholarship as fitting within this school of thought have a fairly
wide range of views on the import of pragmatism and practical reasoning to the law. See, eg.,
Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569
(1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 37-123 (1990) [hereinafter Pos-
NER, PROBLEMS] (explaining the contours of his pragmatic orientation to the law); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990) (using practical reason as a tool in explicating the process of statutory interpretation);
Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (1989) (setting forth his philoso-
phy of practical reason); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827
(1988) [hereinafter Posner, Skepticism] (describing a skeptical outlook about law informed by prag-
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its roots in the philosophy of pragmatism. 8 Specifically, the Article un-
dertakes a pragmatic critique of evidence scholarship, and it reveals that
the myopia caused by optimistic rationalism extends far beyond the fail-
ure of evidence scholars to see the applicability of fashionable jurispru-
matism and practical reason); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987) (attacking foundationalism in First Amendment juris-
prudence and suggesting instead the use of practical reason); Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reason-
ing and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985) (arguing
that practically based ends-means rationality is an adequate method of legal justification); Joseph W.
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 n.8 (1984)
(describing his position as "irrationalism" but noting that "[a] better term might be pragmatism").
My interpretation of practical reason will be developed throughout this Article. At this point,
however, I think it important to note that "practical" bears no relationship to "that which is imme-
diately useful or ideologically mainstream." Burton, supra, at 747 n.l. Thus, I reject Professor
Feinman's characterization of the movement; rather, I agree with Professor Burton that practical
reason can be used to justify action radically different from existing social custom. See id; see also
Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1811, 1813
(1990) (noting that individuals as ideologically diverse as Richard Posner and Roberto Unger are
philosophical pragmatists). At the same time, I embrace the view that practical reason offers an
antidote to the nihilism that characterizes much cls literature. See John Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 332-33 (1986).
8 The philosophical roots of legal pragmatism can be traced to the works of American pragma-
tist philosophers such as Peirce, James, and Dewey, as well as European philosophers such as
Wittgenstein and Habermas. See, eg., 5 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, What Pragmatism Is, in COLLECTED
PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 3d prtg. 1965);
WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND FOUR ESSAYS FROM THE MEANING OF TRUTH (Ralph Barton
Perry ed., 1942); JOHN DEWEY, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1941); JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE
THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (2d ed. 1929); JOHN
DEWEY, THE QUEsT FOR CERTAINTY (1929); JOHN DEWEY, ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC
(2d ed. 1918). For an excellent overview of the early pragmatists and their views pertinent to the
law, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 787-815, 864-67
(1989). Grey classifies Oliver Wendell Holmes as an early legal pragmatist despite his professed
contempt for some pragmatist philosophers and their views. See id. at 788-89, 805-36, 864-70.
Grey's thesis is that Holmes's professed ambivalence toward pragmatism stemmed from his "predic-
ament [of being] an instrumentalist without an adequate system of ends." Id. at 850.
Two contemporary philosophers, Richard Rorty and Richard J. Bernstein, have had the great-
est influence on the legal community's recent embrace of pragmatism. RICHARD RORTY, CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982) [hereinafter RORTY, CONSEQUENCES]; RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
PROFILES (1986) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES]; RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN,
BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983); see Singer, supra note 7, at 7 n.13; Peter D. Swan,
Critical Legal Theory and the Politics of Pragmatism, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 349 (1989) (comparing the
philosophies of Rorty and Bernstein and their impact upon legal scholarship, specifically through an
examination of the work of Professor Singer). These contemporary philosophers might be termed
"neopragmatists," for their views diverge from those of the earlier American pragmatists in two
important ways. First, neopragmatists "talk about language instead of experience or mind or con-
sciousness, as the old pragmatists did. The second respect is that we have all read Kuhn, Hanson,
Toulmin, and Feyerabend, and have thereby become suspicious of the term 'scientific method.'"
Rorty, supra note 7, at 1813 (footnote omitted); see also Grey, supra, at 789-91 (noting that ne-
opragmatists reject the logical positivist orientation of their predecessors). This latter deviation from
old style pragmatism-that is, the rejection of science as having a special claim to truth-is an
important feature of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 170-86.
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dential movements to their activities. In fact, optimistic rationalism is
nothing other than a foundationalist theory of evidence law. Like all
foundationalist theories, rationalism purports to be an overarching prin-
ciple from which right answers regarding evidence doctrine can be logi-
cally deduced; and like all foundationalist theories, rationalism
necessarily fails to meet its promise.9
This Article contends that strict adherence to optimistic rationalism
has blinded evidence scholars to the reality that the law of evidence is as
indeterminate as all other areas of the law. At its core is not a single
goal-the attainment of truth-but a number of important, complex,
and, alas, competing considerations. Answers to questions concerning
the appropriate configuration of evidence doctrine cannot be deduced
from a unitary principle; indeed, they cannot be deduced at all. Rather,
arguments about evidence doctrine must be conducted in the realm of
"practical reason." Practical reason is the process through which indi-
viduals argue about and justify decisions made under conditions of im-
mutable uncertainty; it is, fundamentally, a conversation. The methods
of practical reason include induction, analogy, ends-to-means rationality,
and the test of time.10
The monolithic acceptance of rationalism as the foundational princi-
ple of evidence law has operated as a cognitive straightjacket for genera-
tions of evidence scholars. Once scholars recognize that their single-
minded pursuit of accurate verdicts is neither a comprehensive nor fully
coherent enterprise, they will take notice of a whole range of potentially
beneficial doctrinal reforms that they have heretofore ignored or reflex-
ively dismissed. But the purpose of this Article is not to argue for any
particular reform. Instead, its objectives are more fundamental: to liber-
ate evidence scholarship from its unnecessary and unfortunate narrow-
mindedness and to demonstrate how practical reason could be employed
to justify alternatives to current doctrine and practice.1
These objectives cannot be accomplished, however, without address-
ing a second factor contributing to the impoverishment of contemporary
evidence thought. Almost without exception, evidence scholars are logi-
cal positivists. Simply stated, logical positivism is the view that truth is
limited to that which can be verified through the processes of objective
science. Not incidentally, evidence scholars' largely instinctive accept-
ance of logical positivism is related to their universal acceptance of opti-
9 See infra part II.
10 See infra parts III-IV.
11 The reader may detect the exhortatory nature of this goal. Indeed, I agree with Steven Smith
that pragmatism is less a philosophy or theory and more a form of exhortation-a call to "scholars
and judges to avoid intellectual vices that they already acknowledge as such but are nonetheless
prone to commit." Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 446 (1990).
My call is for the community of evidence scholars to "achieve self-awareness of its own discourse,
and reassess its features on a continuous basis." Rubin, supra note 7, at 1859.
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mistic rationalism, for the two are conceptual cousins. The project of
optimistic rationalism-the ongoing refinement of trial procedures in
pursuit of a system that accurately reproduces historical truth-is, at
some level, an effort to make the adjudicatory system increasingly more
scientific. 12
The combination of evidence scholars' foundationalism with their
logical positivism accounts fully for the exceedingly narrow focus of
modem evidence scholarship. 13 Specifically, it explains why evidence
professors have turned with increasing frequency in recent years to em-
pirical social science for answers to evidence questions. Faithful to the
rationalist tradition, they start with the assumption that their overarch-
ing goal is to seek ways of ensuring the rectitude of trial outcomes. As
logical positivists, they believe that scientific inquiry is essential in deter-
mining which particular doctrinal configurations will achieve this goal.
As a result, modem evidence scholars have argued that solutions to is-
sues as diverse as the admissibility of hearsay, the propriety of witness
preparation, and the efficacy of demeanor evidence can be reasoned from
existing social scientific research data or from the results of a program of
future empirical endeavors.14
This Article's second main task is to place the importance of social
scientific inquiry to the reform of evidence doctrine in better perspective.
It takes the position that social scientific inquiry is less useful and more
12 See infra text accompanying notes 157-71.
13 Evidence scholars' foundationalism is also at the root of the "new evidence scholarship," a
term coined by Professor Lempert in 1986. Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Ana-
lyzing the Processes of Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439 (1986). The "new evidence scholars" and their
critics have been engaged in lively debates over the extent to which jury decisionmaking can be
modeled through the use of logic and mathematics and over the efficacy of a number of competing
decisionmaking models. See Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evi-
dence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REv. 893, 900-01 n.31 (1992) (describing the "heated debates in
contemporary evidence scholarship over appropriate descriptive and normative models of jury deci-
sionmaking" and delineating the main schools of thought in this area); TwINING, supra note 2, at
119-20 (summarizing the debate between proponents of a mathematical approach to probabilistic
reasoning and proponents of a nonmathematical approach to such reasoning); Craig R. Callen, Cog-
nitive Science and the Sufficiency of "Sufficiency of the Evidence" Tests, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1113, 1113-
16 (1991) (discussing the current debate surrounding the adequacy of a purely statistical approach to
fact finding); Davis A. Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof and Choice, 66 B.U.
L. REv. 825, 826 (1986) (listing five schools of "inferential direction"). The interest of evidence
scholars in these issues rests on their usually unarticulated belief that improved insight into jury
decisionmaking could be used to prescribe rules and procedures designed to achieve more accurate
jury verdicts. See, eg., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401,
426 (1986) (arguing that a reconceptualization of jury trials in light of probability analysis is impor-
tant because it "may lead to fewer errors being made at trial"). But see Lempert, supra, at 469-71
(commenting on Professor Allen's position, noting that "it is clearly not irrational for a system of
trial proof to pursue ends other than or in addition to the minimization of verdict errors"). This, of
course, is the goal of all optimistic rationalists. A more specific look at the new evidence scholarship
is beyond the scope of this Article.
14 See supra note 2; infra notes 18, 166.
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costly than most evidence scholars presently surmise. The fundamental
support for this position is based, once again, in the philosophy of prag-
matism.15 Most importantly, this Article will demonstrate that social
science data cannot be applied to legal questions without resorting to
techniques such as analogy, induction, authority, ends-to-means rational-
ity, and the test of time-that is, the very fundamentals of practical rea-
son. Thus, social science research cannot, on average, provide solutions
to evidence problems any more authoritative than solutions suggested by
other methods of practical reason; in other words, applied social science
is, itself, nothing more (though nothing less) than one facet of practical
reason. 16
Importantly, this reconceptualization of applied social science does
not mean that empirical research is a worthless endeavor that ought to
stop. Despite its inherent limitations, social scientific inquiry slowly adds
to our shared understanding of the human condition and quite appropri-
ately affects the practical discourse of law. Nevertheless, this Article will
demonstrate that the current preoccupation of many evidence scholars
with social scientific research has not been cost-free. In many instances,
this preoccupation has caused scholars to call for quite radical reforms
based upon "scientific" research with little or no consideration of impor-
tant competing-but nonquantified-concerns. Worse yet, the empirical
data these scholars rely upon as definitive support for their proposals are
often incomplete or subject to varying interpretations. At the same time,
staunch empiricism has caused other evidence scholars to adopt the radi-
cally conservative position that doctrine should not be reformed at all
unless changes are supported by empirical study. 17
An outline of this Article is as follows. Part I sets forth the contours
of the rationalist tradition. Part II examines the category of legal formal-
ism known as foundationalism and argues that rationalism is firmly en-
trenched as a foundationalist principle of evidence scholarship. This
Part points out that rationalism suffers from two of the problems inher-
ent in all foundationalist principles: its faithful application sometimes
leads to absurd results and other times leads to no result at all. Part III
explores in much greater detail the consequences resulting from the dom-
ination of rationalism within evidence scholarship. It begins by exposing
how rationalism's focus on the goal of accuracy implicitly overestimates
the objectivity of jury verdicts and continues by setting forth a number of
concerns ignored or significantly undervalued by rationalist thought.
The third Part then examines the manner in which rationalism has led to
a fundamental distortion of the discourse within the evidence commu-
15 An early and extremely influential book explicating a pragmatic approach to the philosophy
of science was THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). See infra
note 173.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 186-90.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 191-209.
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nity. Part IV sets forth a theory of practical reason and proposes it as a
replacement for foundationalism in evidence thought. Part V explores
the connection between rationalism, logical positivism, and the increas-
ing dominance of social scientific study in evidence scholarship. The sec-
ond section of this Part evaluates the costs and benefits of empirical
research to the reform of evidence doctrine. Part VI is a brief
conclusion.18
I. THE RATIONALIST TRADITION
Professor William Twining has written at length about what he has
labeled the "rationalist tradition" in evidence scholarship. The central
tenet in this tradition is that the
direct end of adjective law is rectitude of decision ... through accurate
determination of true past facts material to precisely defined allegations...
proved to specified standards of probability or likelihood on the basis of
careful and rational weighing of evidence... presented (in a form designed
to bring out truth and discover untruth) to supposedly competent and im-
partial decision-makers with adequate safeguards against corruption and
mistake .... 19
As Professor Twining notes, the rationalist tradition has long and solid
roots, dating from "Gilbert through Bentham, Thayer and Wigmore to
Cross and McCormick. ' '20
On the whole, evidence scholars have been both aspirational and
optimistic in their rationalist orientation. In other words, although most
evidence scholars have criticized the doctrinal configuration of their day,
they have aspired to rationalism, and they have been optimistic about the
feasibility of achieving this goal.21 Indeed, it is not unfair to characterize
the last two centuries of Anglo-American evidence scholarship as an es-
sentially monolithic debate over the nature and direction of reform that
will speed progress toward the rationalist ideal. Evidence scholars who
have challenged the fundamental assumptions of the rationalist model
have been quite rare.22
18 One final introductory note is in order. For purposes of illustration, this Article makes peri-
odic reference to three specific examples of evidence scholarship: J. Alexander Tanford, The Law
and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REv. 71 (1990); Stephan Landsman, Reforming
Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disin-
terested Witnesses, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 547 (1984); and Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1075 (1991). I have selected these articles for extended treatment because they are
representative of the most interesting and provocative work that evidence scholars have produced in
the area of "law and social sciene"' in recent years. Of course, I also refer to numerous other
examples of evidence scholarship throughout this Article.
19 TWINING, supra note 2, at 73 (numbers omitted).
20 Id. at 71.
21 Id. at 75.
22 Professor Twining identifies only two evidence scholars who have seriously questioned the
foundations of rationalism: James Glassford, a Scottish Advocate and Sheriff-Deputy who wrote in
1820, and Professor Kenneth Graham. Glassford "was a pioneering exponent of a 'holistic' ap-
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Straightforward statements concerning the primacy of the rational-
ist objective of obtaining accurate verdicts are ubiquitous in modern evi-
dence scholarship. For example, Professor Landsman clearly proclaims
his rationalism in Adversary Procedure. He states at the outset that his
concern about the preparation of disinterested witnesses stems from the
fact that testimonial distortions "can be a major cause of adjudicatory
error. ' 23 In addition, Professor Landsman reiterates in his conclusion
that his proposal "represents an attempt to reform the adversary system
in ways that maintain adversarial vitality while improving adjudicatory
accuracy." 24
In many cases, however, scholars exhibit a fundamentally rationalist
attitude but reference it only indirectly. Professors Tanford and Well-
born fall into this latter category. In Jury Instructions, Professor
Tanford quotes with approval the Supreme Court's admonition that our
proach to the evaluation of judicial evidence ..... Id. at 77. Professor Graham has characterized
rationalism as an "obfuscating ideology which has been used to legitimate institutions and doctrines
that uphold an ethos of social control, which is technocratic, hierarchical, centralized and statist."
Id. at 78 (footnote omitted); see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Procedural-
ism, 61 TEX. L. REV. 929 (1983) (book review); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 'There'll Always Be an
England': The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204 (1987) (book review).
In the next chapter of his book, Professor Twining examines whether "modem versions of
scepticism and relativism," including philosophical skepticism, historical relativism, and phenome-
nology, call into question the central tenets of optimistic rationalism. TWINING, supra note 2, at 92-
152. The title of this chapter, "Some Scepticism About Some Scepticisms," sums up his general
conclusion; Professor Twining is himself an optimistic rationalist.
Interestingly, Professor Twining does not include within his analysis pragmatism or practical
legal studies. This omission is evident from a review of his chart comparing the rationalist's assump-
tions with those of the skeptics he has examined. See id at 132. For instance, he depicts the ideal
rationalist as adhering to a correspondence theory of truth, juxtaposing against this the variant of a
coherence theory of truth. Id. He does not consider the pragmatic attitude toward truth: that both
the coherence and correspondence theories are simply "noncompeting trivialities." RORTY, CONSE-
QUENCES, supra note 8, at 17. "For pragmatists, 'truth' is just the name of a property which all true
statements share." Id. at xiii. William James defined the pragmatic view of truth this way: it is "the
name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable
reasons." JAMES, supra note 8, at 59.
23 Landsman, supra note 18, at 549.
24 Id. at 586; see also Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1341, 1348 (1987) ("Rules of evidence and procedure are routinely evaluated by their alleged effect
on the accuracy of the trier's factfinding."); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979) ("The generally articu-
lated and popularly understood objective of the trial system is to determine the truth about a particu-
lar disputed event."); Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 380 n.46 (1992) (agreeing with Professor Swift that a theory of
operational accuracy should underlie evidence rules); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle,
73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 232 (1988) ("The reasonably accurate determination of disputed factual is-
sues is ... the pivotal task to be performed at trial ... ").
Indeed, I have stated the rationalist credo myself. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 898 ("Most
scholars agree that the primary purpose of the rule against hearsay, like most other rules of evidence,
is to assist the fact finder ... in ascertaining an accurate picture of historical truth.") (footnote
omitted).
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jury trial system depends on the "crucial assumption... that juries will
follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. '25 He contends
that the question whether juries comprehend and obey instructions
"strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of our current litigation system."' 26
Without doubt, Professor Tanford's belief in the importance of this issue
is based upon its connection to the goal of obtaining accurate jury ver-
dicts. A full account of his thesis is as follows: if juries are misunder-
standing or disobeying instructions (explicitly stated), inaccurate verdicts
are the result (implicit assumption), and the legitimacy of trial by jury is
jeopardized (explicitly stated).
Similarly, Professor Wellborn sets out in Demeanor to challenge the
widely held premise "that ordinary people [i.e., jurors] untrained in de-
tecting deception will make significantly more accurate judgments of
credibility if they have the opportunity to view the demeanor of a wit-
ness."' 27 If demeanor evidence does not "enhance judgments of credibil-
ity . . . it is appropriate to reexamine several legal doctrines and
practices. '28 Professor Wellborn's interest in demeanor is thus directly
tied to the accuracy of credibility judgments, which is, of course, a criti-
cal factor in obtaining accurate verdicts. His fundamentally rationalist
perspective is confirmed when, after determining that demeanor evidence
does not, in fact, enhance credibility judgments, 29 he concludes that trials
with live testimony are still desirable because, inter alia, "with regard to
accurate factfinding-a broader issue than accuracy of credibility deter-
minations-live testimony may well have overall positive value." 30
On very rare occasions, an evidence scholar has expressly ques-
tioned the centrality of the rationalist premise. The most celebrated re-
cent instance of this phenomenon was the publication of Charles
Nesson's article regarding the social acceptability of verdicts.31 In this
25 Tanford, supra note 18, at 73 (quoting Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
26 Id.
27 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1075.
28 Id. at 1076.
29 Whether this claim is supported by the social scientific evidence upon which he relies is dis-
cussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 187-89, 203-04.
30 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1092. Wellborn does note that trials serve purposes beyond the
accurate determination of facts. But this statement does not call into question his essential rational-
ist ideology. See infra text accompanying notes 76-85.
31 Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. Rav. 1357 (1985) [hereinafter Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?]. Professor
Nesson reiterated his views in Charles R. Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factflnding at
the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. Rav. 521 (1986).
Another prime example of an article in which an evidence scholar expresses an alternative view
of the function of trials is Milner Ball's essay examining the trial as a theatrical event. See Milner S.
Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28
STAN. L. Rv. 81 (1975). Professor Ball rejects the notion that a trial is simply the means to an end;
rather, he states that "the live presentation of witnesses in the courtroom... is also an end in itself."
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article, Professor Nesson takes the position that the "object of judicial
factfinding is the generation and projection of acceptable verdicts-ver-
dicts that the public will view as statements about what actually hap-
pened, which the legal system can then use as predicates for imposing
sanctions without further considering the evidence on which the verdicts
were based."' 32 In Professor Nesson's view, acceptable verdicts are criti-
cal to the central moralizing and educative functions of the law; the trial,
though ostensibly about truth-seeking, is in fact "a drama that the public
attends and from which it assimilates behavioral messages." '33 Although
measures to promote accurate verdicts will often promote acceptable
ones, this is not always the case. Moreover, Professor Nesson illustrates
that, contrary to the evidence community's stated goal of pursuing the
rationalist ideal, some facets of evidence doctrine can be understood only
Id. at 82. Although he argues that the theatrical aspects of live trials further the goal of just out-
comes, id. at 100-06, he stresses that, if this were the only goal, other processes might achieve the
same result with more economy and efficiency. Therefore, Professor Ball's main objective is to eluci-
date other purposes for the live trial, such as the redirection of aggression and the preservation of a
space that provides an image of legitimate political community. Id. at 107-13.
Unlike Professor Nesson's article, Professor Ball's essay has not attracted a hail of critical re-
sponse. In my opinion, this is because Professor Ball makes his points more subtly, relying heavily
(as his title suggests) on metaphor. The full import of Professor Ball's perspective has simply gone
unnoticed. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
32 Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, supra note 31, at 1358. Professor Nesson had challenged
the centrality of rationalism in an earlier piece on presumptions, though in a less systematic way.
See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences The Value of Complexity, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979). There, after noting the popularity of the rationalist ideal, he
states: "But another, perhaps even paramount, objective of the trial system is to resolve the dis-
pute. ... From an instrumentalist viewpoint, authoritative resolution might even today seem to be
the real goal, with ascertainment of the truth but a useful means to that end." Id. (citation omitted).
Professor Nesson's later piece on the acceptability of verdicts appears to be an extension and refine-
ment of this earlier observation.
It is possible that Professor Nesson was influenced by the work of his colleague, Laurence Tribe,
who had previously questioned the centrality of the rationalist ideal in the context of scrutinizing the
use of mathematics during the trial process. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1372-77 (1971). In the course of examining
the efficacy and propriety of permitting explicit reference to probability theory during jury trials,
Professor Tribe points out that it "would be a terrible mistake to forget that a typical lawsuit,
whether civil or criminal, is only in part an objective search for historical truth. It is also, and no
less importantly, a ritual." Id. at 1376. Therefore, Tribe concludes, even though probability theory
might-if properly applied-further the quest for truth, it should nevertheless be prohibited because
its use would result in the diminution of the presumption of innocence and the quantification of
sacrifice in criminal cases, and the dehumanization of justice in all cases. Id. at 1368-77.
Though Professor Tribe's rejection of rationalism predates that of Professor Nesson, it is signifi-
cantly less remarkable because Professor Tribe resorts to nonrationalist argument only after setting
forth a long and detailed critique of statistical evidence from within the rationalist tradition. See id.
at 1332-68 (arguing that, for a variety of reasons, the explicit use of statistical evidence at trial would
impair the jury's ability to determine objective historical truth).
I am not alone in my interpretation of the work of Professors Nesson and Tribe. See Lempert,
supra note 13, at 470 (noting that Professors Nesson and Tribe "elaborated a model of the trial
which attended to values other than rationality").
33 Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, supra note 31, at 1360.
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as reflecting a preference for achieving acceptable verdicts rather than
accurate ones.34 On a normative level, Professor Nesson argues that,
though it is unsatisfactory and uncomfortable to admit, "[o]ne who is
absolutely committed to the process of ascertaining and testing the truth,
and who would thus shun any concession of the search for truth for the
production of acceptable verdicts, may find that he does so at the expense
of other important values."'35
The vehemence and near unanimity with which other evidence
scholars have attacked Professor Nesson's thesis are themselves operative
measures of the continued vitality of rationalism. 36 For instance, a stu-
dent author dismissed Professor Nesson's theory as "cynical." ' 37 In Sta-
tistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice,38 however,
Daniel Shaviro levels one of the most sweeping criticisms at Professor
Nesson's position.39 Professor Shaviro begins with the proposition that
"[a]part from any practical benefits of deciding cases accurately (such as
improving deterrence), the accuracy of verdicts has moral implica-
tions."40 Morality equals justice, which can be achieved only by ob-
taining verdicts consistent with historical truth. Thus, in Professor
34 Specifically, Professor Nesson uses cases involving "naked statistical proof" to show that
highly probable verdicts, if "unacceptable," are rejected by the courts. See id. at 1378-85. On the
other hand, he refers to the problem of conjunction to illustrate that highly improbable verdicts are
often "acceptable" and are therefore routinely upheld by the courts. See id. at 1385-90.
35 Id. at 1392.
36 1 note that the articles authored by Professors Nesson and Tribe sparked a great deal of debate
regarding the use of statistical evidence at trial, which quickly led to and became intertwined with a
larger debate over the efficacy of various mathematical models of jury decisionmaking behavior, all
of which was later dubbed the "new evidence scholarship" by Professor Lempert. See supra note 13.
Some participants in these debates have, in fact, defended the Nesson-Tribe view that naked statisti-
cal evidence should not be considered sufficient to support a verdict. See, e.g., Craig R. Callen,
Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L. REv. 457 (1991). These de-
fenses have not, however, endorsed Professor Nesson's fundamental rejection of rationalist ideology.
See, ag., id. at 466 (arguing that Professor Shaviro failed to consider arguments exposing the weak-
nesses of bare statistical evidence other than those articulated by Professors Tribe and Nesson).
37 Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1786, 1807-08
(1980).
38 Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 530 (1989).
39 Professor Shaviro encompasses within his criticism the similar views expressed by Professor
Tribe. See id. Professor Allen has also authored a comprehensive critique of Professor Nesson's
point of view. See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the 'Acceptability of Verdicts' Thesis,
66 B.U. L. REv. 541 (1986). Professor Allen's affirmation of the rationalist tradition is evident from
his conclusion:
It is a tenet of our civilization that legal rights and obligations should, in general, rest on as
accurate a reconstruction of reality as is feasible in the context of any particular dispute. The
Acceptability Thesis requires that we pretend that obvious departures from rational efforts to
reconstruct reality are in fact statements about it. Instead, we should continue to strive for
rationality and not be sidetracked down Professor Nesson's blind alley of drama, ritual, and
mysticism.
Id. at 562.
40 Shaviro, supra note 38, at 532.
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Shaviro's view, one who would advocate trumping the rationalist ideal
with some other principle (such as the promotion of acceptable verdicts)
is, in effect, damning the judicial system to immoral action.41 Few evi-
dence scholars have defended the Nesson thesis in light of these at-
tacks. 42 One might thus view the responses to Professor Nesson as
having restored an equilibrium in which rationalism reigns supreme.43
41 See id. at 534-43. Professor Shaviro goes on to criticize Nesson's thesis on a number of other
grounds. In general, he questions the validity of a critical assumption underlying Professor Nesson's
thesis: that a rule which does not in fact further accurate factfinding can nevertheless promote a
perception of fairness. See id. at 543-53.
My guess is that, to most readers, Professor Shaviro's critique of the Nesson thesis seems quite
convincing. If I am correct, this is simply another example of the strength with which the rationalist
ideal shapes modern evidence thought. I hope that by the conclusion of this article at least some
readers will agree with me that the debate between Professors Shaviro and Nesson is not a case of
good versus evil.
42 The defenses of the Nesson thesis have generally been qualified and contextual. For instance,
in examining the efficacy of the rule against hearsay, I have argued that the promotion of acceptable
verdicts is laudable, at least to the extent that it does not conflict with the achievement of accurate
ones. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 925.
Similarly, Professor Tanford has argued that the evidentiary rule excluding prejudicial evidence
(such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403) helps preserve the adversariness of our adjudicatory system,
achieve efficiency in decisionmaking, and obtain politically acceptable verdicts-even when these
goals conflict with the goal of verdict accuracy. See J. Alexander Tanford, A Political Choice Ap-
proach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 845-58 (1989). In so doing, Professor
Tanford cites Professor Nesson with apparent approval. Id. at 855 n.167. What is telling about
Professor Tanford's position, however, is his argument that, because the prejudice rule "involves
conflicting fundamental values that cannot all be respected," it should be analyzed in accordance
with the "political choice" paradigm, meaning that "it is the province of the appellate courts, not the
trial judges, to choose which values to favor over others." Id. at 865. Professor Tanford thus treats
the prejudice rule as a special case within evidence doctrine, a point verified by the fact that in his
subsequent article concerning jury admonitions he exhibits a fundamentally rationalist orientation.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. The point of this Article is that all evidence doctrine
implicates these competing concerns.
Professor Cohen has stated that the Nesson thesis has "undeniable intuitive appeal" that ex-
plains "our reluctance to [permit] verdicts based on 'naked statistical evidence' more convincingly"
than alternative theories. Neil B. Cohen, The Costs of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, and
Aversion to Statistical Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REv. 563, 567 (1986). Nevertheless, Professor Cohen's
article is hardly a defense of the Nesson thesis; rather, Professor Cohen's project is to show that the
promotion of acceptable verdicts over accurate ones-or, in the context of the argument over naked
statistical proof, "event-verdicts" over "evidence verdicts"--comes at a significant cost. Id. at 568-
70.
43 It is somewhat ironic that most contemporary evidence scholars also fit into the category of
"complacent rationalists" (see TWINING, supra note 2, at 75). That is, they believe that, on the
whole, current doctrine reasonably satisfies the rationalist ideal. Proof of the complacency of mod-
em evidence scholars can be established by articulating obvious reform proposals that clearly foster
rationalism-and seem, at least on their face, feasible-but have been almost completely overlooked
in Anglo-American evidence literature. Such reforms might include:
-imposing a post-trial comprehension test to ensure that the jury has understood the critical
aspects of the case. If too many jurors fail the test, the verdict would be invalidated;
-providing trial transcripts to jurors on a daily basis so that they could study them at home
and use them during deliberations;
-permitting jurors to ask questions of the court, counsel, and the witnesses to minimize the
possibility that they might decide the case on an erroneous view of the facts or law;
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The above exposition should not be taken to suggest that pursuit of
accuracy is the only principle underpinning the law of evidence. No one
doubts that the truth-finding process must at some point be limited by
the practical need to resolve legal disputes with reasonable dispatch.
Moreover, some rules of evidence explicitly rest, at least in part, on ratio-
nales wholly at odds with truth-finding.44 The traditional rule barring
the introduction of evidence pertaining to subsequent remedial measures
is one example.45 The fact that a party has remedied a design defect or
dangerous condition after it has caused an injury is probative evidence: it
increases the probability that the party acted unreasonably (and therefore
negligently) by failing to address the harm prior to the accident. Admis-
sion of such evidence would thus seem to assist the factfinder in deter-
mining historical truth.46 Nevertheless, the traditional rule operates to
exclude such evidence based primarily on the rationale that a contrary
rule would cause persons to leave dangerous conditions unremedied,
which would result in additional harm. 47 Thus, accuracy of verdicts is
sacrificed to accomplish a more important external objective. Other rules
falling in this category include those which exclude privileged informa-
-permitting the jury to call certain witnesses, particularly expert witnesses if the jury is con-
fused over a technical point;
-setting up courtrooms to provide for three juries of six or eight or ten persons each, having
the juries deliberate separately, and requiring a unanimous verdict both within each jury and
among all three juries (or perhaps declaring victorious the party that wins two out of three
verdicts).
Complacency leads to the belief that proposals of this kind are too drastic to merit serious attention.
In my opinion, the current state of apathy rests on evidence scholars' general, though unstated,
acceptance of a Darwinian theory of evidence law, as follows: (I) since trial by battle came into
disfavor, generations of common-law judges and evidence scholars have been united in their pursuit
of accurate verdicts; (2) each generation has developea and modified evidence doctrine in further-
ance of this goal; (3) these modifications have slowly but steadily moved humanity ever closer to the
attainment of the rationalist ideal; (4) the task left for current and future generations of evidence
scholars is to improve upon this foundation; (5) improvement will come with changes at the margin.
Cf. STEPHEN TOULMIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 135-44 (1972) (setting forth a Darwinian ap-
proach to the historical development of scientific knowledge).
In any event, it is ironic that evidence discourse has been impoverished not only by its founda-
tionalism and logical positivism-the main theses of this article-but also on its own terms by apa-
thy toward the status quo.
44 Similarly, it is not at all uncommon to find evidence scholars referencing goals of our adjudi-
catory system other than the pursuit of accurate verdicts. Indeed, the authors of two of the three
articles employed herein for illustrative purposes have, on other occasions, proffered nonrationalist
justifications for components of evidence doctrine. See Tanford, supra note 42, at 845-58 (arguing
that the rule excluding prejudicial evidence is designed to promote "legal accuracy," adversariness,
efficiency, and the acceptability of verdicts); Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary Sys-
tem: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 487, 526 (1980) (defending the adversary system because, inter alia, it promotes the
social acceptance of verdicts). My point is not that evidence scholars are unaware of these other
goals, it is that they often fail to realize their significance. See infra part III.C.
45 See FED. R. EVID. 407.
46 The evidence is thus relevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.
47 See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
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tion4" and offers to compromise49 or plea bargain.50
Interestingly, it is often argued that even these rules have a truth-
furthering component as well. For instance, the subsequent remedial re-
pair rule can be justified on the ground that such evidence is more likely
to mislead the factfinder than help it arrive at an accurate verdict. The
factfinder might be too quick in assuming that "because the world gets
wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before."51 Similarly, at least
some of the privileges, especially the attorney-client privilege, are com-
monly defended on the ground that, in the long run, they are more likely
to produce rather than hinder accurate verdicts in an adversary system.5 2
In any event, the existence of a few areas of evidence doctrine where
rationalism has arguably given way to a competing goal does not call into
question the fundamental primacy of the rationalist ideal. The excep-
tions are narrowly defined and operate only at the edges of evidence law.
The vast majority of evidence doctrine-regarding relevance, unfair prej-
udice, character evidence, hearsay and its exceptions, expert testimony,
judicial notice, authentication, and best evidence-has the rationalist ob-
jective of fostering accurate verdicts at its core.5 3
48 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 & advisory committee's note.
49 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408.
50 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 410.
51 Hart v. Lancashire & Y. Ry., 21 L.T.R. 261, 263 (Ex. 1869), quoted in FED. R. EvID. 407
advisory committee's note.
52 See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1470 (1966) (In an adversary system, determina-
tion of the truth requires "the fullest uninhibited communication between the client and his attorney,
so that the attorney can most effectively counsel his client and advocate the latter's cause.").
53 Any reader who continues to doubt this assertion needs only to examine the leading textbooks
on evidence for additional proof. (I use the word textbook rather than casebook because this more
accurately describes most of the books being used to teach evidence in contemporary law school
classrooms.) For example, Professors Lempert and Saltzberg state in their textbook that "the 'truth-
finding' model [of the law of evidence] dominates. Generally speaking, rules of evidence are to be
judged by whether or not they increase the chance that the jury will reach a correct verdict." RICH-
ARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHAN A. SALTZBERG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 148 (1982)
(footnote omitted). Professors Lempert & Saltzberg do raise other possibilities: the trial as a battle;
the trial as an "elaborate ritual designed to reconcile losing litigants to their fate"; and the trial as a
method of dispute settlement (where emphasis is on closure rather than accuracy). Id. The first of
these they see as "ancestral trappings" that modern evidence will never completely shed. The sec-
ond they dismiss as cynical because it depends on the mere "appearance of fairness." Id. The third
they acknowledge as motivating some legal doctrine, though it is telling that the aspects of doctrine
they specify-limited rights of collateral and direct appeal, rules of res judicata, and statutes of
limitations-are not traditionally associated with the law of evidence.
Similarly, Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick state in their textbook that the "mistrust of juries
is the single overriding reason for the law of evidence." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 1 (1988). They separately specify "accurate factfind-
ing" as a goal of the law of evidence, but they note that the mistrust of juries is a specific instance of
the more general concern about accuracy. Id. at 2 & n. 1. They cite in addition the goals of further-
ing substantive policies related to the litigation (such as burdens of proof) and furthering policies
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In sum, at least since the time of Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, 54 the law of
evidence has been dominated by one central guiding principle: that the
goal of evidence doctrine is to maximize the probability that the
processes of litigation will result in an objectively accurate verdict. Other
goals have been granted some recognition, but they have never chal-
lenged the primacy of the rationalist ideal, and their importance in the
overall development of evidence law has been slight. On very rare occa-
sions, an evidence scholar has made the claim that some other principle,
such as the pursuit of acceptable verdicts, is deserving of a status
equivalent to that granted the pursuit of accurate ones. Rather than ig-
nite a dialogue, such challenges have resulted in reflexive reaffirmance of
optimistic rationalism by members of the evidence community. As the
next section demonstrates, optimistic rationalism thus qualifies as a
foundationalist theory of evidence law.
II. RATIONALISM AS A FOUNDATIONALIST PRINCIPLE
A. Formalism and Foundationalism
Evidence scholarship, though dramatically influenced by legal real-
ism in some ways, 55 is in one very important respect a repository of legal
formalism. Dating back to Langdell, formalism is the belief that the law
is a closed analytical science, like mathematics. Formalists assert that
rules of law, and their exceptions, can be logically deduced from initial
premises. In the formalist's world, if the initial premises are "true" and
the deductive process "valid," the outcome is legally "correct." In addi-
tion, there can be only one correct answer to any given legal problem.56
Few contemporary legal scholars defend formalism per se.57 But
this does not mean that formalism is dead. In its contemporary form,
formalism most often appears disguised as foundationalism. Founda-
tionalism is the attempt to articulate a "single dominant value"58 or
unrelated to the goals of litigation. Id. at 1-2. Only the latter goal directly conflicts with the pursuit
of accurate verdicts.
54 See SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, H. Lintot 1756).
55 See infra text accompanying note 159.
56 See Burton, supra note 7, at 778-79; Rubin, supra note 7, at 1855 ("There once was a time
when legal scholars did lay claim to objectivity. They believed they were engaged in the process of
discovering true legal principles that stood above and beyond the ordinary sphere of law, or that they
were tracing the implications of principles that had been discovered. This doctrine is now known as
'formalism.' ") (citation omitted); Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1663 (1990) ("Legal formalism is the idea that legal questions can be answered
by inquiry into the relation between concepts and hence without need for more than a superficial
examination of their relation to the world of fact. It is, therefore, anti-pragmatic as well as anti-
empirical.").
57 There are, of course, exceptions. See, eg., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism" On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949
(1988).
58 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at 1618.
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"grand theory" 59 underlying an area of law.60 A foundationalist theory
claims to represent the building blocks upon which a large doctrinal
tower can rest.61 Although the architect of such a theory might not be a
full-fledged formalist because she rejects the notion that "the law" is a
closed analytic system, she nevertheless maintains that from her founda-
tionalist principle a portion of legal doctrine can, in fact, be logically
deduced. 62 The goal of foundationalism is to provide a uniform and ob-
jective method for judges (and presumably scholars) to answer difficult
legal questions.63
Though most legal scholars would like to think that "we are all real-
ists now," 64 the persistence of foundationalism in many areas of the law
belies this claim. For instance, Professors Farber and Frickey recount a
history of First Amendment scholarship replete with competing founda-
tionalist theories. 65 Similarly, Professors Eskridge and Frickey reveal
three incompatible grand theories of statutory construction that have
been advocated by various academic and judicial thinkers during the
twentieth century. 66 A careful examination of judicial opinions and legal
scholarship in other areas of the law would no doubt betray additional
foundational tendencies.
The fundamental problem with foundationalist theories is that they
necessarily fail to accomplish their stated objective: they do not provide
the singular concept or value upon which an area of legal doctrine can be
logically constructed. 67 Any legal issue worth theorizing about is simply
59 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 321.
60 The notion of foundationalism in the law is borrowed from philosophy. "'Foundationalism'
is a long name for the age-old philosopher's dream that knowledge might be grounded in a set of
fundamental and indubitable beliefs." Grey, supra note 8, at 799.
61 Professors Farber and Frickey introduced the metaphor of bricks supporting a tower. See
Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at 1639-41.
62 See id. at 1615 (Foundationalists "attempt to identify a single unifying purpose ... from
which they then deduce answers to concrete ... problems.").
63 See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1617-21
(1990) (discussing foundationalism).
64 See Burton, supra note 7, at 779; see also Rorty, supra note 7, at 1811 (To the extent that no
one speaks about a "science of law" anymore, "everybody seems to now be a legal realist.").
65 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at 1617-18.
66 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 324-25.
67 1 am taking a stronger position on this issue than some other practical scholars. Even if one
were to canvass all existing foundational theories and demonstrate that they were flawed, one would
still not have "scientifically proven" that a valid foundational principle cannot exist. See Farber &
Frickey, supra note 7, at 1626-27. My argument that foundationalist theories necessarily fail rests
itself on methods of practical reason: induction, analogy, and authority. I am convinced that
foundationalism is doomed to failure because I have yet to find a foundationalist theory that works,
even though many have been advanced by brilliant legal thinkers. Cf. id. Furthermore, I am relying
on the authority of Richard Rorty that centuries of inquiry by philosophers have failed to produce a
satisfactory foundational theory of philosophy. See RORTY, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 8, at xiv
("Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define the
word 'true' or 'good,' supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this
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too complex and too contextual for one theoretical principle to produce
satisfactory answers to all its questions. A foundationalist theory simul-
taneously proves too little and too much. In other words, if some specific
factual settings were decided in accordance with the logic of the founda-
tion, the result would be patently absurd.68 On the other hand, at least as
to some issues, a foundational theory will be indeterminate; the principle
plus deductive logic will fail to produce any answer at all.69
Foundationalism leads to a number of additional debilitating effects
on thinking and reasoning about the law. This issue will be addressed
later, however. First it is necessary to give context to this discussion by
examining the rationalist tradition within the law of evidence in light of
the foregoing explication of foundationalism.
B. Rationalism as Foundationalism
The rationalist ideal-that the central object of the law of evidence
is to maximize the accuracy of trial verdicts-is a paradigmatic example
of a foundationalist principle. As the earlier discussion of rationalism
made clear, pursuit of accuracy is undoubtedly the "single dominant
value" or "grand theory" underlying the vast majority of evidence doc-
trine. Moreover, scholars have traditionally approached questions con-
cerning the optimal configuration of evidence doctrine by starting with
the rationalist premise and then attempting to deduce from it a correct
answer.70  Evidence scholarship has thus been overwhelmingly
foundationalistYI
As with all foundationalist theories, faithful syllogistic application
area. It might, of course, have turned out otherwise .... But in fact [it] hasn't. The history of
attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such attempts, is roughly co-extensive with the history of that
literary genre we call 'philosophy'-a genre founded by Plato.").
In any event, my argument does not depend upon the truth of the statement that foundational-
ism is universally doomed to failure. It is sufficient for my purposes that foundationalism in the
context of the law of evidence is logically flawed and that the result of foundationalism in this
context has been negative. See infra text accompanying notes 72-125.
68 Cf Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at 1619-21 (particular foundational theory of First
Amendment, resting on notion of self-realization, would seem to protect heroin use and some forms
of espionage while excluding from protection corporate speech and commercial advertising).
69 Cf. id. at 1625 (foundational theory of First Amendment resting on notion of tolerance fails to
answer question whether public access to criminal trials is protected speech); Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 7, at 325-29 (grand theory of statutory construction based on intent of the legislature is
very often indeterminate).
70 As we shall see below, evidence scholars sometimes abandon analytic inquiry, i.e., deduction,
for synthetic inquiry, Le., empiricism. See infra text accompanying notes 162-66. For present pur-
poses the distinction is irrelevant because in both instances scholars begin with the rationalist ideal
(the "grand theory") and then turn to "scientific" ("objective") methods to determine the "correct"
doctrinal answer. This is the essence of foundationalism.
71 Indeed, what appears to be unique about the law of evidence is the extent to which the
foundationalist principle of rationalism has gone virtually unchallenged for the better part of two
centuries. See supra text accompanying notes 19-54. In other areas of the law, scholars have typi-
cally engaged in extended debates over which of numerous foundational principles is the most effica-
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of rationalism leads in some instances to indefensible or absurd out-
comes. Consider, for example, Professor Welborn's article regarding de-
meanor evidence. 72 As set out above, Professor Wellborn starts from a
position of rationality and the premise that if demeanor evidence does
not further the quest for accurate verdicts, doctrine based on this as-
sumption is fundamentally suspect.7 3 After reviewing the pertinent so-
cial scientific literature, Professor Wellborn concludes that demeanor
evidence amounts to "distracting, misleading, and unreliable non-verbal
data." 74 Accordingly, he argues that "strictly with regard to accuracy of
credibility judgments, ... legal procedures could be improved by aban-
doning live trial testimony in favor of presentation of deposition
transcripts. '75
Professor Wellborn's analysis thus points him toward a rather dras-
tic recommendation: that our system of live trials be replaced wholesale
with one in which judges would supply jurors with a packet of written
materials, give them ample opportunity to read it, and then ask them to
deliberate and render a verdict.76 Although he successfully manages to
dodge this absurd outcome,77 how he does so is very telling. Professor
Wellborn first journeys outside of the law of evidence-to the Confronta-
tion Clause-to conclude that, at least in criminal cases, constitutional
constraints dictate a live trial.78 Next, he argues that the logical implica-
tions of his analysis are politically unacceptable: "Purely as a political
matter, American lawyers and nonlawyers would not tolerate any major
curtailment of an institution so deeply embedded in our legal
tradition. '79
cious. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. The unitary nature of the evidence community's
foundationalism has resulted, in my opinion, in an especially distorted and impoverished discourse.
72 Wellborn, supra note 18, passim.
73 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
74 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1091.
75 Id.
76 If jurors cannot use demeanor evidence to help determine when witness testimony is false or
inaccurate, surely they would be no more successful in using it to evaluate lawyers' arguments. Thus
it follows from the combination of rationality and Professor Wellborn's conclusions that the pros-
pects of reaching an accurate verdict would be furthered not only by providing jurors with written
transcripts of testimony, but also by providing them with written versions of the lawyers' opening
and closing statements. Whether the judge's instructions ought to be oral or written does not appear
to be impacted by Professor Wellborn's analysis. Cf Tanford, supra note 18, at 93, 103-06 (instruc-
tions ought to be both written and repeated orally several times).
77 By saying this, I do not mean to pass judgment on the question whether we should change our
system from a primarily live event to a primarily written exercise. The absurdity of the situation
stems from the fact that Professor Wellborn feels compelled to assess whether live trials ought to be
abandoned based solely upon his examination of the truth-furthering function of demeanor evidence.
78 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1091.
79 Id. at 1091-92. It is very interesting to note that Professor Wellborn does not include the
academic community in this observation. Given their foundationalist perspective, many evidence
scholars probably would call for sweeping doctrinal change if they were convinced that demeanor
evidence seriously impairs the factfinding process. Indeed, one can imagine Professor Shaviro argu-
1012
88:995 (1994) Modern Evidence Scholarship
Undoubtedly sensing the inadequacy of these arguments,80 Profes-
sor Wellborn continues with the observation that live testimony-as op-
posed to demeanor evidence-may further the search for truth by
deterring dishonest witnesses.81 Finally, with neither a cite to Professor
Nesson nor an extended discussion, Professor Wellborn turns to the
counter-principle of acceptability of verdicts. His discomfort with hav-
ing to resort to this principle is obvious from the tentative nature of his
statements: "It is probably more important that the results of litigation
be accepted than that they be accurate.... Live testimony may be essen-
tial to perceptions of fairness .... '82 He supports this point, not with
evidence cases, but with a return to constitutional doctrine. 83 Professor
Wellborn's sigh of relief is almost audible when he reaches the conclusion
that "[r]ecognition of the weakness of demeanor evidence does not herald
a revolution in trial procedure."'8 4 Nevertheless, Professor Wellborn's ra-
tionalist perspective gets the better of him once again when he makes a
potentially revolutionary recommendation concerning the rule against
hearsay. He calls for the abolition of the prerequisite of unavailability for
the introduction of former testimony and pretrial depositions in civil
cases.8 5
ing that any other course of action would be immoral. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
On the other hand, given their complacency, it would be quite difficult to convince most evidence
scholars that such sweeping changes were necessary in the first place. See supra note 43.
80 The inadequacies are patent. As to the first argument, the Confrontation Clause is irrelevant
to the vast domain of civil litigation. Moreover, the clause has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as furthering the same goal as the rule against hearsay, Le., the rationalist goal of facilitating
accurate verdicts. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 943 n. 152. If one shares this view of confrontation
protection, there is no logical reason why one would not at least consider the possibility of reforming
confrontation doctrine to accommodate Professor Wellborn's conclusions rather than passively ac-
cepting the Confrontation Clause as an impediment to "progress."
As to the second argument, the self-interested objections of the trial bar and the protests of an
ignorant public are hardly principled reasons to eschew law reform aimed at increasing the accuracy
of verdicts.
81 This argument points to the indeterminacy of the rationalist ideal. See infra text accompany-
ing note 86.
82 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1092 (emphasis added).
83 Id. Specifically, Professor Wellborn cites the Supreme Court's decision in Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988).
84 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1094.
85 Id. at 1098-99. This recommendation could lead to the conversion of civil trials from live
events into multimedia presentations of videotape and transcripts. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 925
& n.104. This would, indeed, mark a radical departure from current practice.
Contrary to my assertion, Professor Wellborn states that his hearsay proposal is "hardly radi-
cal." Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1098. He notes that other evidence scholars-including Dean
McCormick-have advocated comparable reform and that similar rules were included in both the
1942 Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence. Id. He also points out that
Texas has permitted the free use of depositions in civil cases for a long time; this practice has not led
to the excessive use of depositions in lieu of live witnesses in Texas courts. Id. at 1099.
Professor Wellboru's claim of modesty for his suggested reform is less than persuasive. The
proposals he relies upon for precedent provide little support for his cause; the evidence community
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Foundational rationalism not only leads evidence scholars down a
primrose path toward extreme conclusions, but is also far more indeter-
minate than they commonly recognize. Professor Welborn's analysis
provides an example of this phenomenon as well. As he notes, by mis-
leading the jury, demeanor evidence may hinder the search for the truth,
but the requirement of live testimony, by deterring untruthful witnesses,
might help it.86 Thus, the ultimate question whether live testimony mer-
its preservation as a fundamental part of the trial process cannot be re-
solved by resort to the foundationalist principle of rationality. Professor
Wellborn misses the significance of this point when he argues for the
abolition of the unavailability requirement for former and pretrial testi-
mony. He fails to consider the possibility that, because of the difference
in settings, the prophylactic protection against lying may be greater for
in-court testimony than for testimony elicited at a deposition. If so, it is
impossible to determine whether the offering of depositions in lieu of live
testimony at trial would aid or impede verdict accuracy.
Professor Landsman's reasoning in Adversary Procedure provides
another example of undetected indeterminacy. Professor Landsman sets
out to examine whether pretrial preparation of disinterested witnesses
ought to be subject to greater regulation.8 7 The article follows this line of
reasoning: the goal of litigation is rectitude of trial outcomes; the testi-
mony of disinterested witnesses is a critical factor in the outcome of
many cases; pretrial contacts with disinterested witnesses significantly in-
crease the probability that their testimony will be distorted by suggestion
(innocent or otherwise); therefore, pretrial contacts with disinterested
witnesses must be sharply regulated, and suggestion, if not eliminated,
must be minimized to the extent humanly possible. 88 Professor Lands-
man's logic is fundamentally flawed because he ignores the fact that sug-
gestion has the power not only to impair but also to improve the
accuracy of trial testimony. Suggestion jeopardizes the purity of memory
but enhances its completeness. 89 Therefore, whether a strict prohibition
on pretrial suggestion would frustrate or facilitate the rationalist quest
rejected both of them explicitly because it considered them to be too revolutionary. See Seigel, supra
note 13, at 893-94 n.4, 930 & n. 116. The Texas experience is somewhat more convincing, although it
is certainly possible that if the admissibility of pretrial testimony became the norm across jurisdic-
tions, lawyers would become increasingly more comfortable using it, and the ultimate result would
indeed be a qualitative change in the adjudication of civil cases. See id. at 919.
86 See Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1092.
87 See Landsman, supra note 18, at 548.
88 Id. at 549-70.
89 See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REv. 277, 337-41 (1989). This fact,
which Professor Applegate supports by reference to empirical study, also comports with common
sense. If your memory about an event is fuzzy and someone suggests erroneous details to you, you
might very well adopt those details in the good faith belief that they are true. On the other hand, we
have all experienced situations in which our memory is jogged-and our recollection improved-by
another's suggestion.
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for verdict accuracy is essentially unknowable; in relation to this ques-
tion, the foundational principle is simply indeterminate.
III. ADDITIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF FOUNDATIONAL RATIONALISM
Foundational rationalism has done more than occasionally cause ev-
idence scholars to flirt with absurdity or overlook indeterminacy; it has
resulted in the general impoverishment of evidence discourse.90 Ham-
strung by the narrow view of rationalism, scholars have given insufficient
attention to other values implicated by evidence doctrine, and they have
even ignored some problem areas altogether. The fundamental premise
underpinning this thesis is that accuracy of verdicts, although undoubt-
edly important, is not the only important value relevant to the law of
evidence. This premise requires some defense, which will proceed in two
steps. The first step is a continuation of the partial deconstruction of the
concept of accuracy of adjudicatory verdicts. The second step consists of
the articulation of alternative values that deserve more systematic atten-
tion in evidence scholarship.
A. The Overstatement of Objectivity
Most evidence scholars would defend their foundational rationalism
by pointing out that the law of evidence is unique. In most instances, law
is essentially a normative enterprise, defining what persons ought to do.
Foundationalism, by artificially elevating one value over all others, un-
derstandably leads to bad results. But, evidence scholars would argue,
the function of the law of evidence is to guide the factfinder, typically a
lay jury, to an accurate understanding of historical truth. Verdicts can
be labeled as right or wrong in a truly objective sense-measured by
whether they correspond with historical reality. In a murder case, for
example, the victim is dead, and either the defendant did or did not kill
him. If someone else killed the victim, a guilty verdict would be objec-
tively inaccurate. One might have epistemological skepticism, of course;
that is, one might doubt our ability to know the truth. But that is no
excuse for not trying our best to ascertain it in order to minimize the
90 I use the term discourse to describe the linguistic processes through which scholars and other
members of the legal community conceptualize particular issues and communicate with each other
about them. Participants in a discourse "readily take some, but not other, uses of language seriously
due to criteria of relevance and persuasion supplied by their [implicit] concept of law [or, in this case,
an area of the law], which is the common ground for their legal conversation." Burton, supra note 7,
at 749; see also Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 710,
713 (1988) (A "discourse proceeds on its assumptions, in its own language, guided by its own rules,
and under its own standards of success."). A more exact term might be "deliberative practice." See
Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying
Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 371, 398 (1992)
(describing a deliberative practice as a "discourse directed toward forming and defending
judgments").
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number of wrong outcomes. Therefore, ensuring the accuracy of verdicts
is quite properly the paramount value underpinning evidence doctrine.
Although there is a great deal of truth in this account of the trial
process, it tells only part of the story. There is no question that in some
subset of cases the jury's job is essentially an objective one and the degree
to which the jury has accurately determined historical truth is a full and
coherent measure of the jury's performance. But in many cases the jury's
task is a complex mix of positive and normative endeavors. This is true
in every tort case where the ultimate question is whether a party was
"reasonably prudent," designed a "defective product," or was the "proxi-
mate cause" of an injury; in every contract case where the issue is
whether a party acted in "good faith," exercised "reasonable reliance,"
or provided "substantial performance." It is also true in every criminal
case in which the defendant claims that he lacked the necessary mens
rea--e.g., that his action was not "purposeful" or "reckless"-or where
he claims that his action was "necessary" to prevent a "greater harm," or
ought to be "excused" because of "provocation" or "incapacity."
In cases of the latter kind, the jury's task is best described as choos-
ing between competing characterizations-that is, subjective interpreta-
tions-of essentially uncontested facts, and the jury's verdict is best
understood as a normative judgment about the conduct of one or more of
the parties. 91 Measuring this kind of verdict in terms of the accuracy of
its reflection of historical truth is babble, because accuracy belongs to a
positivist discourse. In these cases, the verdict can be measured only by
concepts such as "fair" or "just"; that is, by concepts from a normative
discourse.
Estimating the percentage of cases that fall into the category just
described is impossible.92 Nevertheless, it can be stated with confidence
91 This observation, of course, is not original with me. See, e.g., Catherine Wells, Situated Deci-
sionmaking, 63 S. CAL- L. REV. 1728, 1742-45 (1990) (noting that one's experience and tempera-
ment influence one's view of the world, resulting in the fact that "a sharp distinction between factual
observations and normative judgments cannot be maintained"); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact
or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 492-94 (1986); TWINING, supra note 2, at 107 ("The notion of'fact'
in adjudication is more problematic than the orthodox view suggests.... Thus it is misleading to
suggest that legal enquiries into questions of fact are value-free."); see also Nancy J. King, Postcon-
viction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92
MICH. L. REV. 63, 124-29 (1993) (arguing that the representation of minorities on a jury "neither
impairs nor enhances [its] ability to ascertain truth; it redefines truth").
Professor Twining states that the evaluative function of the jury is "widely acknowledged" even
within the rationalist tradition. TWINING, supra note 2, at 107. This observation, however, is in
tension with his characterization of the alternative view as "orthodox" and with his statement in
another context that most debates about evidence doctrine ignore this point. See William Twining,
The Boston Symposium: A Comment, 66 B.U. L. REV. 391, 391 (1986). In any event, though evi-
dence scholars have on occasion acknowledged the subjectivity of verdicts, the point has not had an
appreciable effect on evidence discourse.
92 This statement evinces a deliberately conservative approach to this issue. By way of compari-
son, Professor Zuckerman demonstrates with much success that the fact-law distinction is funda-
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that when evidence scholars debate issues of doctrine they are much
more likely to have the purely positivist model of the trial in mind.93
Ergo, they are obsessed with the positivist measure of success: an objec-
tively accurate verdict.
B. The Other Values at Stake in Evidence Doctrine
There are, however, other values that deserve to be raised to a
higher level of consciousness within the evidence community. Without
attempting to be comprehensive or to assign weight or priority to various
values, some preliminary thoughts on the matter can be sketched out.
First, Professor Nesson is correct that the acceptability of verdicts is an
extremely important goal of the law of evidence. Verdicts in both civil
and criminal cases are the precursor to the government's use of its coer-
cive power. If the populace does not accept the legitimacy of these ver-
dicts, society is in serious trouble.94 This does not mean that verdict
mentally artificial and that the jury's function is inherently normative. He describes the jury's role as
going beyond that of simple factfinder to a body that decides cases on their "merits." Zuckerman,
supra note 91, at 494-502.
93 Professor Twining, who has been at this endeavor much longer than I, has made the identical
observation. See Twining, supra note 91, at 391 ("Most debates about evidence, inference, and proof
proceed on the simplifying, but generally false, assumption that jurors mainly decide questions of
pure or simple 'fact,' which can be sharply distinguished from questions of value and of law.").
94 This point can be illustrated by reference to a trial that was the subject of considerable na-
tional attention: the original state prosecution of the police officers accused of using excessive force
against an individual named Rodney King. The incident was captured on videotape; there was little
dispute as to what happened. Rather, the dispute was over how to characterize the event. The
prosecution painted the officers' actions as racist and vindictive. The officers claimed that they were
justified in believing that the force they used was necessary to subdue a dangerous man. The jury
agreed with the defense, and the verdict caused riots in the streets of Los Angeles. See A Juror
Describes the Ordeal of Deliberations, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A32. Many lawyers and politi-
cians condemned the verdict. See Darlene Ricker, Holding Out: Juries vs. Public Pressure, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1992, at 48.
Talking about this verdict in terms of whether it was "accurate" is ridiculous because the jury
made an essentially normative decision. (Given their unthinking acceptance of the rationalist tradi-
tion, most lawyers and law professors who commented on the case missed this point. See, eg., id. at
48-52.) But, in light of the nation's reaction, it seems pretty clear that the verdict was socially
unacceptable. The nature of this reaction ought to give pause to those who would argue that the
acceptability of verdicts is not an important value of evidence law.
The unacceptability of the Rodney King verdict appears to have stemmed from the fact that it
was rendered by an all-white jury who lived in an upper-middle class town far removed from the
streets of Los Angeles. See Frank Tuerkheimer, The Rodney King Verdict: Why and Where to from
Here?, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 849, 850 (claiming that it is "almost impossible" to say that racism played
no role in the Rodney King verdict); Mark Hansen, Different Jury Different Verdict?, A.BA. J.,
Aug. 1992, at 54-57; Richard Lacayo, Anatomy of an Acquittal, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 30 (claiming
that the outcome of the Rodney King case was decided when the trial was moved out of Los Ange-
les). As a result of the verdict, some states are considering legislation designed to lessen the possibil-
ity that changes in venue would result in nonrepresentative juries. See Hansen, supra; see also
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, The Color of Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 62-63
(arguing for such changes). My point is this: it should not have taken a national disaster to cause a
reexamination of evidence doctrine in light of the value of producing socially acceptable verdicts.
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accuracy ought to be sacrificed to achieve acceptability. As the preced-
ing discussion should make clear, this dichotomy is simplistic and
artificial. 95
Another value discounted in evidence scholarship is the need for a
system that efficiently resolves disputes.96 The fact that our judicial sys-
tem is slowly being displaced by alternative forms of dispute resolution
(ADR), for example, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, ought to be
a matter of great concern to evidence scholars-but, from all appear-
ances, it is not.97 In addition to the growth of ADR, more and more
cases are resolved pretrial by settlements and pleas. While the evidence
community blithely argues over the niceties of the hearsay rule, fewer
and fewer cases are actually being tried.98 Evidence scholars' preoccupa-
tion with accuracy to the exclusion of efficiency might one day result in
their complete obsolescence.
The evidence community has also paid insufficient attention to the
value of the trial as ritual and theater. Scholars must always keep in
mind that the trial, as Professor Ball says, "is ... an end in itself."99 He
Moreover, unless foundational rationalism is confronted head-on and the dialogue is undertaken in
the full spirit of practical reason, the outcome of any reconsideration of evidence doctrine will be
unsatisfactory. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
The police officers in the Rodney King case were retried on federal civil rights charges about a
year later. Two of them were convicted. See Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, A Case for
Federal Prosecution, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at B7.
95 A number of the individuals who read early drafts of this Article seemed to miss this very
important point. They accused me of advocating a system where inaccurate outcomes are openly
tolerated so that other goals can be pursued. This is simply not my position. It is critical that our
adjudicatory system maintain accuracy as a central goal. To the extent that accuracy (defined, in my
opinion, by a consensus about what happened) is obtainable, justice (actually, our perception of
justice) does indeed depend on it. Moreover, striving for accurate verdicts will often further other
goals of the system, such as verdict acceptability. None of this conflicts with the central theses of
this Article, namely: (1) accuracy cannot adequately describe many jury verdicts (because of their
subjective nature); (2) accuracy is impossible to measure, meaning that many procedures designed to
pursue it are of unknown and unknowable value; (3) tradeoffs between accuracy and other goals of
our adjudicatory system are inevitable (assuming, for instance, that we want trials to end); and (4)
evidence scholarship would be improved by directly addressing these tradeoffs.
96 I believe that Professor Twining would agree with me. He identifies "nature-of-the-enterprise
scepticism" as the belief that adjudication is about "the termination of disputes by peaceful means or
... [through] routine bureaucratic processing." TWINING, supra note 2, at 131. He notes that
moderate forms of such skepticism serve "as a useful corrective against simplistic or complacent
views." Id. at 132.
97 See, e.g., Don J. DeBenedictis, An Experiment in Reform, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 16-17
(describing heavy reliance on ADR in federal court experiments mandated by the Civil Justice Re-
form Act to reduce the expense of and delays in civil litigation and referencing no evidence scholars
as being involved in the reforms).
98 Even in cases where there is a trial, more and more factfinding is taking place outside of the
arena where the rules of evidence apply. In federal criminal cases, for example, the advent of the
sentencing guidelines has moved a great deal of factfinding to the sentencing hearing, where the rules
of evidence are not in effect. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 2, at 885-91.
99 Ball, supra note 31, at 82.
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continues:
At best, the presentation of a case is a coincidence of reality and illu-
sion, illusion not in the sense of perjury, but in the sense of theatrical meta-
phor-the reenactment of relevant and material elements for reflection and
judgment. Although elusive, this paradoxical interplay of reality and illu-
sion does seem to correspond with the deeper truth of the way we experi-
ence life, which is to say that it is a strength, and not a weakness or fault, in
both the playhouse and the courtroom.10 0
Professor Ball argues that the function of the trial as live theater has
many truth-furthering aspects, such as encouraging impartiality and in-
ducing creativity. Importantly, however, trial as theater also serves some
nonrationalist functions, such as the redirection of both public and pri-
vate aggression. Permitting parties to engage in semantic warfare ac-
cording to established rules and in view of the public serves vital
cathartic and cleansing functions. Also, the theatrical and ritualistic na-
ture of the trial allows citizens to suspend disbelief and accept the out-
come of trials, in a manner similar to the way in which theater-goers
suspend disbelief and engage a play on an intimate and emotional
level.101
Finally, evidence scholarship should not underestimate the values
served by having cases decided by lay jurors. Most importantly, perhaps,
the jury serves as a check on governmental power; it is a cushion between
individuals and the state.102 In addition, the jury provides protection
from official bias.103 Parties in both civil and criminal matters often
choose to present their cases before a jury, not because they believe that
it will reach a more accurate verdict than a judge or a panel of experts,
but because they believe that the jury is more likely to be fair and impar-
tial.10 4 The jury is also more likely to bring to the deliberative process a
100 Id. at 91-92 (footnotes omitted).
101 Id. at 107-15; see also, YALE KAMISAR ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 137, 143
(1965) ("Trials are like the miracle or morality plays of ancient times. They dramatically present the
conflicting moral values of a community in a way that could not be done by logical formalization.").
102 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183-85 (1991)
(discussing jurors as "populist protectors"); Ronald J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Right to
Trial by Jury, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 33, 35 (1988) (noting that the right to trial by jury "is one of our
most democratic institutions .... Its existence breaks the isolation of the law by mandating that
outcomes in trials be determined by individuals extraneous to the system.").
103 See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine,
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REv. 501, 511 (1986) ("Mhe jury provides a 'safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.' ")
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
104 Id. (noting that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for "diffused impartiality")
(quoting Theil v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Profes-
sor Zuckerman would go even further than this, I think. His position is that juries decide cases "on
the merits and not just according to the law." Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 499. By this he means
that the institution of the jury ensures that litigants are judged as individuals and according to their
own peculiar qualities and circumstances. "In our aversion to a blind and unfeeling judicial process
we have set up a system of trial in which the peculiarities of the individual litigant may be taken into
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broader and more representative cross-section of views and values than a
judge or panel of elite specialists.10 5 At the same time, the chance to be a
juror is a very important civic experience. For at least some citizens, it is
one of the few positive direct interactions with their government.10 6
account, even when they are not listed in advance among the circumstances affecting his legal posi-
tion." Id.
The value of the jury is undercut when the jury is not perceived as representative of the commu-
nity or of the parties' differing interests. This also results in a greater chance that the jury's verdict
will not be considered acceptable. See supra note 94.
105 Allen, supra note 102, at 36-37 (pointing out that jurors bring their experience, knowledge,
and perspectives to the decisionmaking process).
106 See Amar, supra note 102, at 1186-87 (discussing "jurors as pupils"); Massaro, supra note
103, at 515 ("Jury duty educates citizens in the mechanics of their justice system and palpably
demonstrates the responsibility of citizens for the quality of government.... A powerful reminder
of the educative aspect of jury trials is the positive reaction many citizens have to their service as
jurors.").
Lest some readers conclude otherwise, I am fully aware of the vast amount of scholarship that
has been written about the role of the jury in our system of adjudication, much of which references
nonrationalist considerations. Furthermore, I recognize that some of this scholarship has been pro-
duced by individuals who, in at least some contexts, fit the description of evidence scholar. This
state of affairs does not contradict my thesis, however, because the vast majority of scholarship about
the jury has been situated in the field of constitutional law, not evidence; the authors of this scholar-
ship have directed their attention to the interpretation of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the right to trial by jury in light of the text and history of the Constitution and the pertinent Supreme
Court jurisprudence. An examination of the most recent scholarship in this area, much of which is
centered upon the issue of jury representativeness, bears this out. See, e.g., King, supra note 91
(using the results of empirical studies to assess the adequacy of Supreme Court jurisprudence regard-
ing racial discrimination by jurors); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury
Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992) (contending that race-based
jury discrimination should be viewed primarily as a violation of the rights of the excluded jurors);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989) (conducting a critical examination of
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning jury selection and the review of jury verdicts); Laurie
Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection
Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1081 (1987) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-
section analysis, and not equal protection analysis, is needed to protect fully a defendant's right to a
fair and impartial jury); Massaro, supra note 103 (examining the history and policy behind the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and proposing the elimination of prosecution peremptories to fur-
ther this right); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611
(1985) (reviewing empirical evidence indicating that racial prejudice affects jury verdicts and propos-
ing constitutional doctrine to protect minority defendants). Among the cited group, Professors King
and Massaro could certainly lay claim to the title "evidence scholar." See ASSOCIATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1992-93, at 1076-77 (including
Professors King and Massaro in national list of evidence teachers).
The examination of nonrationalist justifications for the institution of the jury in scholarship
outside the field of evidence does nothing, of course, to correct the paucity of such considerations
within evidence scholarship itself. Scholars' failure to address these considerations when evaluating
rules of evidence leads to the problem identified in the next section of the text as "micro-distortion."
Moreover, removal of the debate over such issues as jury representativeness from evidence scholar-
ship is an example of "macro-distortion." To the extent that legal scholars have a better chance of
influencing the development of evidence doctrine than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution, this macro-distortion has not been without cost. Cf J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in
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C. The Resulting Distortion of Evidence Scholarship
Evidence scholars' preoccupation with rationality has distorted their
scholarship in two different ways. First, it has caused scholars arguing
for or against any given reform proposal to narrow artificially the scope
of the debate; they either ignore nonrationalist values completely or give
them considerably less than careful and systematic attention. This phe-
nomenon might be termed "micro-distortion." Second, foundational ra-
tionalism has diminished the global scope of evidence discourse. It has
led to the systematic failure of evidence scholars to see, let alone attempt
to solve, many evidence-related issues. This consequence of rationalism
can be labeled "macro-distortion."
One example of micro-distortion has already been discussed in an-
other context: Professor Wellborn's analysis of demeanor evidence.10 7 If
Professor Wellborn had approached the issue of demeanor from a
nonfoundationalist perspective he would not have found himself scram-
bling to avoid the unacceptable consequences of his implicit logic.
Rather, Professor Wellborn would have started from the position that,
because verdict accuracy is only one goal of evidence doctrine, his explo-
ration of the relationship between demeanor and accuracy, no matter
how enlightening, would not call into question the general efficacy of live
trials. Professor Wellborn would have recognized that live trials are crit-
ical to some of the other important goals of the law of evidence; among
other things, they facilitate the acceptability of verdicts by the parties
and the public, provide a forum through which the public can experience
catharsis and cleansing, and define a place where citizens interact with
their government.108
Another example of micro-distortion occurs in Professor Tanford's
article regarding jury instructions.109 One issue Professor Tanford exam-
ines is the use of admonitions, that is, judicial instructions that the jury
should disregard evidence or use it for a limited purpose. 110 He expresses
dismay that appellate courts have approved the use of admonitions in
approximately 21,000 cases since 1958, the year in which the first of nu-
merous empirical studies indicating admonitions' ineffectiveness was
published.1 ' "The very fact that [admonitions] are still used with such
regularity, despite the empirical evidence that they do not work, suggests
that a problem exists."' 112 As diagnosed by Professor Tanford, the prob-
the Adversary System: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1015, 1059
(1990) (ultimately concluding that a rule prohibiting racist use of peremptories by criminal defend-
ants is more practical than a Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 73-85.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
109 Tanford, supra note 18, passim.
110 Id. at 95-99.
111 Id. at 95.
112 Id.
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lem is that judges and lawyers remain inexplicably ignorant about the
worthlessness of admonitions. Thus, he proposes the following remedy,
among others: "[C]ourts must accept that admonitions do not work and
may be counterproductive.... The presumption should be that, because
of the danger, no admonition should be given even if asked for by an
affected attorney."1 3
By remaining true to his rationalist perspective, Professor Tanford
fails to consider whether admonitions serve a function quite apart from
enhancing the accuracy of verdicts. Indeed, admonitions are probably
best understood as a part of the ritual associated with the trial process. If
a court erroneously admits evidence and then sustains an objection, its
failure to strike the inadmissible evidence leaves the issue effectively un-
resolved. An admonition brings closure, a sense that the system has done
its best to make things right. 114 Viewed in this light, the jury's incapacity
to abide by the admonition is simply irrelevant. Not incidentally, this
explanation accounts for the resilience of admonitions better than Profes-
sor Tanford's theory that generations of trial participants have exhibited
intractable ignorance on a fundamental issue of trial practice. Fully
aware that admonitions fail to enhance and may even impede accurate
factfinding, practitioners and judges employ them nonetheless because
they are useful in preserving a sense of integrity surrounding the trial
performance. 1 5
Taken in their entirety, micro-distortions greatly reduce the chance
that evidence discourse focusing upon particular doctrinal issues will be a
lively exchange through which scholars (and judges and practitioners)
tease out all possible arguments for and against specific doctrinal choices
as they work toward consensus. Instead, in most doctrinal debates, a
number of critical issues remain in the background, buried in the sub-
conscious of the participants. The interested parties evaluate doctrine on
the linear scale of promotion of accuracy until, perhaps, extreme ration-
alism threatens to lead to a patently absurd result. Overall, micro-distor-
tion accounts at least in part for the stagnation of evidence scholarship
lamented by Professor Park. 116 It has made traditional doctrinal schol-
arship largely predictable and uninteresting. More problematic, the
113 Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added).
114 Of course, the perfect result for a pure rationalist would be a mistrial. But this is where
rationalism meets pragmatism in almost everyone's book: mistrials are simply too costly in terms of
both time and money to be used in anything but the most exceptional cases.
115 Many of Professor Tanford's recommendations concerning admonitions-for instance, that a
request for an admonition should not be required to preserve one's position on appeal, see Tanford,
supra note 18, at 109-seem eminently reasonable. I am emphatically not passing judgment on these
recommendations. It is simply my purpose to demonstrate that the issue whether admonitions ought
to be retained as a part of the trial process is significantly more complex than Professor Tanford
acknowledges because his view is distorted by foundational rationalism.
116 See supra note 2.
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product of such a skewed discourse-i.e., evidence doctrine-is result-
ingly suspect.
The second harmful effect of foundational rationalism is macro-dis-
tortion. By limiting the goal of evidence doctrine to the pursuit of accu-
rate verdicts, evidence scholars have defined themselves as irrelevant to
the consideration of a number of difficulties faced by our judicial system.
For example, one acute contemporary problem is the overcrowding of
court dockets nationwide. 1 7 In many jurisdictions, the delay in trying
civil cases is many years; in some, the trying of civil cases has been peri-
odically suspended.1 8 As a result, litigants have turned with increasing
frequency to alternative forms of dispute resolution. Evidence scholars
have consistently steered clear of ADR issues, ceding this territory to
others, primarily judges and experts in civil procedure.' 19 The failure of
evidence scholars to engage this debate has had a very specific detrimen-
tal effect: ADR techniques designed by nonevidence scholars have ad-
dressed evidence issues in a uniformly simplistic manner.
First, much of what falls under the rubric of ADR, such as media-
tion and some forms of arbitration, are settlement techniques; they sim-
ply do not count factfinding-the sine qua non of courtroom litigation
(and evidence rules)-as among their goals.120 Even more telling, alter-
native forms of dispute resolution that seek to find facts treat the law of
evidence as an all or nothing proposition: either the "rules of evidence"
apply in their entirety, or they do not apply at all. For instance, Judge
Thomas D. Lambros pioneered what has come to be known as the Sum-
mary Jury Trial (SJT), which consists of the presentation of a case to
actual jurors whose decision is nonbinding.' 2 ' The presentation is made
in argument form by attorneys; no witnesses may be called, although
exhibits may be used. Counsel "are limited to presenting representations
of evidence that would be admissible at trial," though "[f]ormal objec-
117 See Henry J. Reske, Record State Caseloads in 1990, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 23 (reporting
that from 1984-90 civil caseloads increased 30% and criminal caseloads increased 33%; in 1990,
there were a record 18.4 million civil cases and 13 million criminal cases on state court dockets).
118 See, eg., Don J. DeBenedictis, Tight Budget Squeezes Courts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 22
(reporting the possibility that a budget crisis in the federal courts might result in the suspension of
civil jury trials).
119 For instance, recent experiments set up by the federal courts to deal with problems in civil
litigation have focused on issues of civil procedure (such as mandatory discovery) and alternative
dispute resolution. Rethinking evidence doctrine as part of these experiments does not appear to
have occurred to anyone involved. See DeBenedictis, supra note 97, at 16-17.
120 See Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
Federal Courts, 59 FORD. L. Rav. 1, 27 (1990) (noting that the ADR techniques discussed in the
article, including court-sponsored mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary jury trials, and
court-annexed arbitration "are intended to foster settlement"); Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adju-
dicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 528 (1986) (noting that many ADR enter-
prises "advertise themselves as facilitating settlement-not adjudication").
121 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
1023
88:995 (1994)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tions are not encouraged." 122 Thus, an SJT is essentially composed of
extended opening and closing statements about admissible evidence.
At the other end of the spectrum is a proposal for what was origi-
nally called an "Information Exchange" but has been referred to as the
"Mini-trial."1 23 Designed for complex litigation, the mini-trial consists
of an elaborate presentation of evidence and argument to a private judge
by attorneys and expert witnesses. At a mini-trial, the rules of evidence
are suspended. 124
If evidence scholars removed their rationalist blinders and addressed
the task of designing a summary factfinding/dispute resolution proce-
dure that took the multitude of policies underlying evidence doctrine se-
riously, the result would be proposals more sophisticated and satisfying
than those set out above. Experts in the traditional form of dispute reso-
lution-i.e., jury trials-would presumably have much to say about the
trade-offs between the adjudicatory goals of accuracy, efficiency, tradi-
tion, ritual, acceptability, and legitimacy. A robust dialogue in the evi-
dence community about efficient dispute resolution would address such
questions as: Is the goal of creating an abbreviated jury trial, designed to
give litigants their day in open court while preserving the acceptability of
verdicts, realistic and worthwhile? If so, which particulars of evidence
doctrine would merit retention and which ought to be discarded or al-
tered? Would completely reconceptualizing aspects of current practice
help in accomplishing this task?
Moreover, a dialogue concerning the development of sophisticated
ADR techniques could lead scholars to a different perspective on evi-
dence doctrine as a whole. An intermediate result might be experimenta-
tion with different forms of dispute resolution in our courts. In the end,
our trial processes, and the doctrine guiding them, might be fundamen-
tally altered. But none of this is likely or even possible if evidence schol-
ars direct their energies elsewhere and if they reflexively dismiss any
proposed reform that threatens to impair the pursuit of accuracy-no
matter how slight or theoretical the impairment and no matter how great
the gain in efficiency.1 25
This discussion of the limits of contemporary evidence scholarship
has demonstrated that discourse in the evidence community has been ar-
tificially narrowed by an almost monolithic perspective grounded in
foundational rationalism. Rationalism has been shown to lead scholars
122 Id. at 471.
123 See Eric D. Green et al., Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternate Approach, 11 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 493 (1978); see also Lambros, supra note 121, at 467 (referring to Professor Green's "mini-
trial").
124 See Green, supra note 123, at 504.
125 Another example of macro-distortion is evidence scholars' failure to engage in a debate re-
garding the critical issue of jury representativeness parallel to the debate currently raging among
constitutional law experts. See supra note 106.
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to the brink of extreme conclusions and to be much more indeterminate
than scholars sometimes realize. Moreover, it causes evidence scholars
to ignore or discount other values inherent in the process of adjudication.
This latter phenomenon has caused an artificial narrowing of the dis-
course among members of the evidence community regarding the con-
tours of evidence doctrine as well as the scope of litigation problems that
evidence scholarship ought to address.
Once foundational rationalism is confronted and discarded, how-
ever, a new problem arises, one that was effectively obscured by the prior
consensus. Given that values such as accuracy, acceptability, legitimacy,
and efficiency are all implicated by evidence doctrine, how are doctrinal
choices to be made? Consideration of these values will often point in
conflicting directions. With rationalism as a foundational principle, the
answer at least appeared simple: pursue accuracy (until it leads to an
extreme result). What replaces that age-old formula? The next section
develops an answer to this question.
IV. PRACTICAL REASON AND EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP
The law is a practical, as opposed to a scientific or theoretical, enter-
prise. The distinctions between practical and scientific or theoretical en-
deavors are several. First, law is practical because it requires action, even
in the face of tremendous uncertainty about which course of action is
best. Whereas scientists can suspend belief pending the outcome of ex-
perimentation and theorists can simplify problems or simply ignore those
that are intractable, actors in legal settings do not have a parallel choice.
In the practical world, inaction is simply one form of action.12 6
Second, because law is a practical endeavor, the techniques used in
nonpractical domains do not supply answers to legal questions. The
legal realists and their successors, particularly scholars in the cls tradi-
tion, have convincingly demonstrated that formal deductive logic is of
little use in solving legal problems. 127 This is true despite the fact that
126 See Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 836; Burton, supra note 90, at 716; Steven J. Burton,
Comment on 'Empty Ideas': Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136,
1151 (1982) ("A philosopher has the luxury to ... stop writing, and contemplate life in silence....
Lawyers cannot. The untouched problems of life remain. Disputes must be settled, lest we return to
the blood feud."); see also Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a
Clinical Psychologist, 27 J. Soc. IssuEs 65, 89 (1971) ("[I]n the pragmatic contexts of law and
clinical practice ... something will be decided, with or without adequate evidence, good or bad,
scientific or anecdotal."); id. at 92 ("In [pragmatic] matters, not doing anything or not changing
anything we now do is itself a powerful form of action.").
127 Judge Posner takes the position that deductive reasoning can and does solve the vast majority
of legal questions, provided that the validity of the legal rule used to answer the question is assumed.
See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 7, at 42-43; Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 832. In my
opinion, this statement, though true, is a bit misleading. Deducing an answer to a legal question
from an existing rule is the last step in a process that inevitably involves practical reason, for it is
through practical reason that one determines that the legal rule is both applicable and valid. In easy
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much legal reasoning sounds syllogistic; the syllogism is usually the last
step in a legal argument, making an outcome appear to be logically com-
pelled when in fact it rests on some other basis.128
Similarly, the techniques of empirical (sometimes called synthetic)
science cannot ordinarily be employed to answer legal questions.1 29 This
lack of fit stems primarily from the difference between normative and
positive endeavors. Empirical science is exclusively concerned with de-
termining "what is"; law is ultimately concerned with "what ought." In
other words, as a practical enterprise, law seeks to change the empirical
world, not merely to describe it. The techniques of empirical science
may tell us that thousands of persons are victims of homicide in the
United States each year, but they cannot tell us whether and what kinds
of homicide ought to be a crime.1 30
The conclusion that legal reasoning cannot be founded upon either
analytic or empirical science is neither a reason for despair nor an invita-
tion to nihilism. Those who despair of legal reasoning's inability to pro-
duce scientific outcomes are making the fundamental mistake of
attempting to measure the results of a practical endeavor with a positivist
yardstick.131 On the other hand, law is not reducible to politics or pure
cases, the practical reasoning part of the equation may be taken for granted, but it does not disap-
pear.
In any event, this Article concerns itself with the process of law reform; in such cases, Judge
Posner's condition for the use of deductive logic in legal decisionmaking-Le, that existing legal
rules are assumed to be valid-is not met.
128 Judge Posner rightly criticizes judges and lawyers for overuse of the syllogism. See POSNER,
PROBLEMS, supra note 7, at 39-40; Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 865-66.
129 It is here that neopragmatism parts company with traditional legal realism. The realists did
not reject the notion of law as science; rather, they sought to replace what they saw as the fallacious
use of analytic science in the law with empirical science. See Burton, supra note 7, at 777-81 &
n.116; Rubin, supra note 7, at 1855-56 (Legal realism was "positivist because it claimed that the
existing legal rules were a fixed reality that could be discovered by empirical methods. Such empiri-
cism could not be sustained, because of the inherent normativity of law.") (citation omitted).
130 See Burton, supra note 90, at 714-16; Burton, supra note 7, at 784-88. For those who do not
equate "practical" with "normative," see infra note 131, there is another fundamental reason why
empirical science cannot answer most legal questions: a difference in time frames. Law requires
swift action. Science may be unable to provide an answer without decades of research. See POSNER,
PROBLEMS, supra note 7, at 62 ("Society is unable or at least unwilling to allow legal judgments to be
deferred until the results of patient scientific research are available."); Posner, Skepticism, supra note
7, at 836 ("[M]ainly because society is unwilling to allow legal judgments to be deferred until the
results of patient scientific research are available, scientific methods do not yet play a significant role
in legal reasoning.").
131 Thus Professor Burton criticizes Judge Posner's posture of skepticism on the ground that
skepticism about the practical enterprise of the law comes only when one makes the mistake of
trying to measure law's successes by criteria imported from the sciences. See Burton, supra note 90,
at 781-83.
The differences between the versions of practical reason offered by Professor Burton and Judge
Posner are mainly semantic. To Professor Burton, practical reason is by definition a normative
process through which action is justified. To the extent that legal reasoning also depends upon
descriptive (Le., positive) judgments about the world, it mixes practical and scientific elements. But
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arbitrariness. 132 Lawyers recognize that some legal arguments are more
persuasive than others; that the outcome of many cases is predictable;
and that some cases are decided correctly or appropriately, while others
are not. Most lawyers also acknowledge the existence of a subset of cases
where the correct outcome is unclear, that is, where reasonable persons
might disagree.
How then are legal decisions (and scholarly arguments) made and
supported? The answer is this: by the methods of practical reason.
Practical reason is "the capacity of a human being to act intentionally in
various circumstances on reasons for action, notably norms."1 33 It is a
search for contextual justification for the best legal answer among poten-
tial alternatives. 134 At its core, practical reason involves reasoning from
ends to means. 135 "In practical reasoning, we consider the merits of deci-
since the ultimate goal of legal reasoning is action (and not the formation of beliefs), Professor
Burton categorizes law as a practical endeavor. Thus, the "scientific" judgments that form the bases
of legal reasoning must be evaluated by different criteria than judgments made in scientific endeav-
ors. He states: "Significantly, we can be warranted in forming beliefs ancillary to action on weaker
evidence (eg., a preponderance) than would be required when claiming scientific knowledge." Id. at
716.
Judge Posner defines practical reason operatively as "the methods by which people who are not
credulous form beliefs about matters that cannot be verified by logic or exact observation." POSNER,
PROBLEMS, supra note 7, at 71-72. To Judge Posner, practical reason forms the basis for both
normative and (most) positive beliefs in practical endeavors such as the law. His skepticism stems
from his disappointment that law can be scientific on only the rarest of occasions; from Professor
Burton's point of view, disappointment is not warranted because the law is by definition practical,
not scientific.
I adhere to the pragmatic view that both science and law are socially contrived "practices," that
is, "a system of socially constituted modes of argument shared by a community of scholars." Rubin,
supra note 7, at 1841; see also Grey, supra note 8, at 798-805 (detailing the pragmatic view of human
endeavors as practices that are habitual, unconscious, collective, situated, historical, and instrumen-
tal). These practices differ with respect to their communities, discourses, and objectives-and per-
haps with respect to our current perception of their relative success in achieving their objectives.
From this perspective, Professor Burton's emphasis on law's normativity and action orientation and
his disdain of skepticism are both warranted; the enterprise of law is simply different-not better or
worse-than the enterprise of science. On the other hand, Judge Posner's position, which includes
within its scope the observation that some descriptive judgments generated through practical reason
can be at least as persuasive as many scientific ones, see POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 7, at 74, is
more in accord with neopragmatists' rejection of logical positivism. See infra text accompanying
notes 173-75. Although Professor Burton professes a rejection of logical positivism because "it [has]
failed to confine all legitimate knowledge to the scientific," Burton, supra note 90, at 714, he seems
ready to concede that descriptive judgments made in the course of a practical enterprise are inferior
to those of the sciences; his position being that this is of no import. See id. at 716.
132 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 380 ("[T]he failure of [the quest for objective founda-
tions of knowledge] does not consign us to nihilism or ad hoe relativism.... A... lesson of modern
pragmatism is that the opposition between objectivism and relativism is false.").
It is really at this juncture that scholars who identify themselves as "practical" differ from most
of those identified with cls. See Stick, supra note 7, at 332-38; Feinman, supra note 7, at 728-31.
133 Burton, supra note 7, at 747.
134 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at 1647; see also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Forward: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28-29 (1986).
135 Wellman, supra note 7, at 87-88; see also Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 852-53.
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sions and plans of action. We are not concerned whether some state of
affairs is true or false, but whether instead the plan or decision will serve
our purposes and gratify our desires." 136
The methods of practical reason are not neat or categorical; rather,
they are all the devices by which individuals make practical decisions in
every facet of their lives. Judge Posner has summarized the techniques of
practical reason as follows:
Practical reason... is... a grab bag of methods, both of investigation and
of persuasion. It includes anecdote, introspection, imagination, common
sense, intuition .... empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority,
metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, "induction" . . . ,
"experience." 137
This list, as Judge Posner notes, is inexact. It is both duplicative and
incomplete. 138
In many circumstances, the methods of practical reason will pro-
duce definitive answers with little effort. A definitive answer to a practi-
cal question is one that reflects social consensus: some critical mass of
the relevant discursive community, employing methods of practical rea-
son, comes to the same conclusion. 139 Thus, it can be said with certainty
that the law ought to punish arson as a serious crime. This statement,
being normative, cannot be proven in a scientific sense, but that does not
136 Wellman, supra note 7, at 90.
137 Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 838.
138 Id.; POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 7, at 73.
Although he does not explicitly identify it as such, Joseph Singer has offered the following
description of practical decisionmaking:
When judges decide cases, they should do what we all do when we face a moral decision.
We identify a limited set of alternatives; we predict the most likely consequences of following
different courses of action; we articulate the values that are important in the context of the
decision and the ways in which they conflict with each other; we see what relevant people
(judges, scholars) have said about similar issues; we talk with our friends; we drink enormous
amounts of coffee; we choose what to do. There is nothing mysterious about any of this.
Singer, supra note 7, at 65. Professor Singer's description strips away the pretense, making clear that
practical reason is a fancy label for the mundane decisionmaking processes we all use everyday to
understand and cope with life as best we can. See also Ruth Anna Putnam, Justice in Context, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1797, 1797-1810 (1990) (describing a general pragmatic approach to solving legal
problems, based on the philosophy of John Dewey).
Professor Rubin argues that practical reason is appropriate for judges but not scholars. Rubin,
supra note 7, at 1879. He claims that scholars' "specialty is not practical judgment but structured
argument, not general intuition but specialized knowledge, not ad hoc decision-making but system-
atic analysis." Id. I see no conflict between those methodologies that Professor Rubin identifies as
appropriate for scholars and those that he scorns. I agree that scholars ought to accumulate special-
ized knowledge, conduct systematic analysis, and make structured arguments; in doing so, I believe
they will inevitably employ judgment, intuition, and some ad-hoc decisionmaking. If Professor
Rubin means to argue that scholars ought to strive to employ the former methodologies to a greater
degree than at present, my reaction is pragmatic: they should do so only if it furthers their scholastic
goals.
139 See Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 839-40 (practical reason can answer some ethical
questions with a high degree of certainty).
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affect its authoritative status in the realm of the practical.140 Similarly, it
can be stated with certainty that no living human being can fly without
resort to some kind of apparatus. This statement is descriptive, but it
need not be based upon scientific analysis in order to be persuasive. Its
practical strength comes from consensus. No sane human would take
issue with its truth.141
In more difficult situations, the methods of practical reason must be
employed as part of a dialogue or conversation among the individuals
participating in a practical endeavor. 142 For some period of time, the
techniques of practical reason will lead different participants to incom-
patible conclusions. As to issues of this sort, practical reason will not
yield a definitive answer because there is a lack of consensus. 143 If the
issue is particularly intractable, consensus might take years or even gen-
erations to develop. In the meantime, since action cannot be suspended,
participants in the dialogue will act upon their individual practical judg-
ments. On the other hand, even supposedly definitive practical answers
are subject to question and, if there is sufficient force behind the chal-
lenge, to amendment in conformity with a new consensus.
The pragmatic view is that human beliefs and actions ought to be
evaluated by the extent to which they are successful "in helping people
cope with the world" 144 or the extent to which they produce "the desired
practical consequences in application." 145 Thus, judgments reached in
the practical realm of the law should not be measured by scientific crite-
ria such as objectivity and determinacy. Professor Burton argues that
exercises in practical reason should be tested for their "impartiality" and
degree of "good judgment."' 146 "Impartiality refers to the exclusion of ad
hominem considerations, such as advantage to self, friends or groups
with which one identifies .... Good judgment refers to action on the
balance of reasons .... -147 Professors Farber and Frickey stress that
140 Cf id. at 840 (arguing the certainty of the claim that Nazi racial policies were evil).
141 Cf. id. at 839 (arguing the certainty of the proposition that no human being has ever eaten an
adult elephant in one sitting-taking the example from PETER D. KLEIN, CERTAINTY: A REFUTA-
TION OF SKEPTICISM 122 (1981)).
142 See Robert J. Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of
Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REv. 69, 72-111 (1991) (describing various specific ap-
proaches to the pragmatic concept of conversation).
143 See Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 859-60 (tying determinative outcomes to a strong
political and ethical consensus).
144 Grey, supra note 8, at 804 (citing WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 197-236 (1907)).
145 Id. at 806 (citing, inter alia, JOHN DEWEY, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 73 (1941); John Dewey,
Logical Method and the Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924)).
146 Burton, supra note 90, at 715-16; Burton, supra note 7, at 789. Professor Burton also includes
the requirement of "normativity," which he defines as basing one's action on "standards of conduct
that are claimed to prescribe what one ought to do." Id.; Burton, supra note 90, at 716.
147 Burton, supra note 90, at 716. In a similar vein, Professors Farber and Frickey proffer
nonarbitrariness as a criterion of sound practical reason. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at
1652.
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valid practical reason requires careful deliberation1 48 and evinces a con-
cern for "history and context; a desire to avoid abstracting away the
human component in judicial decisionmaking; an appreciation of the
complexity of life; some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance for
ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a skepticism of rigid
dichotomies; and overall humility."1 49
In considering the validity of practical outcomes, some scholars
have focused less on individual instances of decisionmaking and more on
the means through which social consensus on practical matters are devel-
oped. For example, Richard Bernstein has emphasized that practical dis-
course depends upon the existence of true "dialogical communities"
based upon "solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition."1 50 It is
only within such communities that "non-distorted, reciprocal communi-
cation" among all interested individuals can take place.151 Moreover,
148 Farber & Frickey, supra note 7, at 1647.
149 Id. at 1646. Contrary to the view of Judge Posner, I do not believe that Professors Farber and
Frickey are advocating an alternative to practical reason, which Judge Posner labels "new conven-
tionalism." See Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 887; see also POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 7,
at 452 (including Professors Farber and Frickey in the category of neotraditionalists). Judge Posner
interprets their article as offering an antidote to skepticism, and he criticizes the indeterminacy of
what they offer in the place of foundationalism. See Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 887. As the
text makes clear, I believe that Professors Farber and Frickey are merely advocating criteria by
which to judge applications of practical reason, and I think that their criteria are of some value.
Moreover, they do not claim that practical reason carried out in accordance with their criteria will
produce definitive outcomes in tough cases--quite the contrary. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 7,
at 1647. Thus their position provides an antidote to skepticism only in the same sense that Professor
Burton's view rejects skepticism, ie., they take the position that, since practical reason is our only
tool to solve practical problems, there is nothing to be skeptical about. See id. at 1652.
In a vein similar to that of Professors Farber and Frickey, Professors Minow and Spelman
explore the importance of context in pragmatic decisionmaking. Minow & Spelman, supra note 63,
at 1625-52. They note that the real question is not whether one makes a decision "in context," but
"what context should matter" to the decisionmaker. Id. at 1629, 1651. They conclude that "in
many contemporary political and legal discussions, the demand to look at the context often means a
demand to look at the structures of power, gender, race, or class relationships, or the effects of age
and physical vulnerability on people's abilities to protect themselves.... Looking at context could
mean a constant reminder of the human beings connected and separated by moments of judgment,
acts of decision, requests for solution." Id. at 1651-52.
150 BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES, supra note 8, at 223-24.
151 Richard J. Bernstein, Introduction to HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 1, 11 (Richard J. Bern-
stein ed., 1985).
Professors Eskridge and Frickey note that undistorted communication requires the members of
a dialogical community to be candid about the reasons for choosing a particular course of action.
Without candor, practical decisions cannot be fairly evaluated by others engaged in the conversation.
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 363-64, 378-84.
In tension with this viewpoint, Judge Posner wonders whether the lack of candor by our courts
is itself a practical method of ensuring that the judgments of courts will be respected by the public.
See Posner, Skepticism, supra note 7, at 865. I think that his musing on this point stems from his
(unjustified) angst over his apparently belated discovery that law is not scientific. As I see it, the
public need not be shielded from the fact that the law rests on practical decisionmaking because this
is far removed from arbitrariness or whim. Indeed, I think more candor in judicial decisionmaking
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Professor Bernstein contends that this kind of communication is impossi-
ble unless "we realize and initiate the material social conditions that are
required for mutual communication." 15 2 In a similar vein, other scholars
have noted the connection between a robust participatory democracy and
the goal of achieving freely formulated agreement on social and political
matters. 153
This discussion of practical reason allows the earlier examination of
evidence scholarship to be -placed in a fuller context. For the most part,
modern evidence scholars have achieved consensus concerning the main
contours of evidence doctrine. This consensus has been based, however,
not on practical reason, but on a shared foundationalism. The consensus
is thus illegitimate.154 This Article calls upon the evidence community to
renew its dialogue over evidence policy and doctrine in the spirit of prag-
matism and practical reason. This dialogue must be conducted with
more sensitivity to the complexities of human life and to the competing
values that are at stake in our system of justice. It also must reflect a
heart-felt desire to examine, re-examine, and call into question our fun-
damental perspectives and assumptions.1 55 If this call is heeded, the evi-
dence academy will undoubtedly face a period of disagreement and
uncertainty unparalleled in recent times; but as a new consensus emerges,
the resulting doctrine will have the benefit of resting on valid practical
judgments (that are always subject to re-examination). 156
would ultimately engender more respect for our courts. In addition, as I have expressed elsewhere, a
candid view of the legal enterprise would reduce the amount of cynicism among those who practice
law. See Seigel, supra note 13, at 945-50.
152 Bernstein, supra note 151, at 11; see also Swan, supra note 8, at 374-75 (discussing Bernstein's
pragmatic philosophy and making the further point that Bernstein recognizes that communication
within contemporary American society is fundamentally distorted by prevalent forms of
domination).
153 See, eg., Singer, supra note 7, at 66 ("The alternative to 'foundations' is not 'chaos' but the
joint reconstruction of social life ... the quest of participatory democracy.") (quoting Gerald E.
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1386 (1984)); see also
Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710-11 (1990)
(emphasizing that to pragmatic (as well as feminist) scholars, a critical question when one is deter-
mining whether "we" have reached consensus is, "Who is 'we'?").
154 In addition, given the long history of race and gender discrimination on the part of legal
institutions of all kinds, there can be no question that this consensus has been reached without the
free and full participation of all individuals affected by our adjudicatory system. This is another
basis upon which to conclude that the consensus is illegitimate. See supra text accompanying notes
150-53.
155 Cf Rubin, supra note 7, at 1843-44 (The "critique of methodology" (in the case of this Arti-
cle, neopragmatism) requires that participants in scholarly endeavors "recognize the limits of our
mental frameworks" and "comprehend the way that we construct or select these frameworks. This
difficult but necessary project requires collective self-awareness, the ability of a community of schol-
ars to develop an understanding of their own pattern of thought, and to evaluate its operation.").
156 I am aware that some readers are thinking at this point, to quote an old song, "Is that all there
is?" The answer, I'm afraid, is "Yes." In many respects, pragmatism, and its derivative practical
reason, are-to use the term currently in vogue-banal. First, pragmatism is mostly, as Professor
Grey has put it, "freedom from theory-guilt." Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Ste-
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Unfortunately, there is one additional barrier to the development of
a lively, practically oriented dialogue within the evidence community. In
the last two decades, evidence scholars have directed much of their en-
ergy toward empirical research. The next section takes a close look at
this development.
V. RATIONALITY, LOGICAL POSITIVISM, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
A. A Brief History and Analysis of Law and Social Science
The history of the relationship between law and social science in
twentieth-century America has been marked by distinctive ebbs and
flows. Beginning with the "yellow psychology" 157 of Hugo Miinster-
berg, 158 and repeated during the legal realist movement' 59 and periodi-
cally ever since, some segment of the social scientific community, or the
legal academic community, or both, has critiqued legal actors' general
failure to investigate scientifically the descriptive assumptions upon
which legal doctrine is based. For a period of time following such criti-
cism, some subset of legal scholars and social scientists embarked on the
mission of scientizing the law. On every occasion, these efforts met with
general failure and ended in a round of mutual recriminations. Some
amount of time later, the cycle began anew. 160
Legal scholars and social scientists are currently experiencing a pe-
riod of unprecedented harmony and mutual respect. This period, which
began in the mid-1970s, has fostered the creation of a number of law and
vens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990). That is, it is a response to and a
rejection of earlier views espoused in both philosophy and law that these human endeavors can and
should be built on formal theories or methodologies that are more than merely pragmatic. On the
other hand, legal pragmatism rejects the radical nihilistic implications of its close cousin, critical
legal studies. To individuals not engaged in the debate over the essence of law, my pragmatic de-
scription of legal discourse almost certainly appears superfluous and relatively vacuous. Moreover,
if Professor Grey is correct in his claim that "pragmatism is the implicit working theory of most
good lawyers," id. at 1590, my description also appears obvious. My response to readers who have
come to this view is twofold: (1) perhaps we will someday reach the point when all legal scholars are
pragmatic, so that frequent discussions of pragmatism and practical reason will be unnecessary; (2)
even then, given the natural human tendency to construct and admire elegant grand theories, occa-
sional pragmatic exhortation will still be required.
157 The term was popularized by Professor Loh. See Wallace D. Loh, Psycholegal Research: Past
and Present, 79 MICH. L. REV. 659, 660 (1981).
158 See HUGO MONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908), and Professor Wigmore's scath-
ing response, John H. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a
Report of the Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 ILL. L. REv. 399 (1909).
159 See John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale
Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 463 (1979) (describing legal realism as, in part, "an episode in the
continuing confrontation between law and the social sciences over the past fifty years").
160 This view of the cyclical nature of the relationship between law and social science was first set
out by Harry Kalven, Jr. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry
and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56, 58-59 (Geoffrey Hazard ed., 1968). It was
expounded upon by Professor Loh. See Loh, supra note 157, at 660-77.
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social science journals and, not unrelatedly, an exponential increase in
the number of law and social science articles and books.161 A dispropor-
tionate fraction of this scholarship has been situated in the law of evi-
dence,162 including numerous studies of the adversary system, 163 the
functioning of the jury,164 witness testimony,165 and, most recently, the
hearsay rule.166 Although legal scholars have occasionally criticized par-
ticular studies 167 and have even questioned the validity of specified meth-
ods of applied social science on more than one occasion, 168 support
within the evidence community for the continuation of social scientific
research efforts is, at present, widespread and firmly rooted.
Scholars have advanced two main theories to explain why empirical
research has clustered around evidence doctrine. One is that legally un-
sophisticated social scientists are enamored with the jury trial, which of
course implicates the law of evidence.1 69 The other proffered explanation
is that social scientists find the trial process easy to simulate, especially
compared to other legal settings. 170 Although these hypotheses are help-
ful in understanding why social scientists want to study the law of evi-
161 See Loh, supra note 157, at 659-60 & nn.3-4 (detecting and documenting the "coming of age"
of the relationship between law and psychology); John Monahan & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Psychol-
ogy of Law, 33 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 441,441-42 (1982); June Louin Tapp, Psychological and Policy
Perspectives on the Law: Reflections of a Decade, 36 J. Soc. IssuES 165, 168-72 (1980) (charting the
burgeoning field of law and psychology).
162 See Loh, supra note 157, at 678 (reviewing literature between 1973 and 1981 and concluding
that most of it has focused on criminal trial process); Tapp, supra note 161, at 170-72 (noting that
studies regarding the jury and the judicial process, particularly related to criminal trials, dominated
the previous ten years of work in law and psychology); MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT (1978) (collecting and analyzing almost 400 empirical studies related to the
trial process).
163 See, eg., E. Allan Lind & Laurens Walker, Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Labora-
tory Research on Legal Issues, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5 (1979); E. Allan Lind et al., A Cross-
cultural Comparison of the Effect of Adversary and Inquisitorial Processes on Bias in Legal Decision-
making, 62 VA. L. REv. 271 (1976); E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in
Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1973).
164 For a review of this literature up to 1977, see Kathleen Gerbasi et al., Justice Needs a Blind-
fold: A Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323 (1977).
165 See, eg., A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979);
ELIZABETH F. LoFrUs, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
166 See, eg., Miene et al., supra note 2; Kovera et al., supra note 2; Stephan Landsman & Richard
F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay
Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 65 (1991).
167 See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman & Annie Oppie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Poli-
cymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 150-52 (criticizing certain
aspects of a father custody study); Loh, supra note 157, at 686-90 (criticizing certain aspects of
eyewitness testimony studies).
168 See, eg., Loh, supra note 157, at 699-704 (criticizing jury simulations on various grounds).
169 See Tapp, supra note 161, at 176 ("The seduction of the courtroom seems tied to the appeal of
advocacy and the drama of the adversary.").
170 See Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence, 4
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 191 n.88 (1980) ("No topic in psychology and law has been so exten-
sively studied as jury behavior. Yet, the jury forms a very small part of the legal system. It seems
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dence, they do not account for the receptivity of evidence scholars to
nonlegal interlopers. The explanation for this latter phenomenon, here-
tofore overlooked, is the following: evidence scholars have become in-
creasingly enamored with social science as they have grown more and
more unified in their foundational rationalist outlook-because both are
founded upon a deep faith in things "scientific." In other words, evi-
dence scholars are, by and large, logical positivists.
Logical positivism is the view that objective answers to empirical
questions can be obtained only through scientific pursuits. 17 1 Although
evidence scholars recognize that the trial process will never replicate the
methods of science, their rationalism can in large measure be character-
ized as a yearning for such an outcome. Thus, it should come as no
surprise that, when given the opportunity, evidence scholars turn to sci-
ence for answers to legal questions. The opportunity arises, of course,
when they contemplate law reform.
Despite the prevalence of a contrary sentiment, 72 this has not been
a completely fortuitous development. Evidence scholars' devotion to so-
cial science research has tended to rest on an unwarranted faith in the
"objectivity" of science. In recent decades, philosophers of science have
abandoned logical positivism for a more realistic assessment of scientific
knowledge. They have argued quite persuasively that the scientific enter-
prise is not now, nor can it ever be, neutral or objective.173 Rather, the
apparent that much of the disproportionate attention given this topic by research psychologists
stems from the ease with which jury processes can be simulated in experimental settings.").
171 "The philosophers who developed this tradition [logical positivism] sought to sustain a vision
of science as the source of absolute truth." Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 615 (1988). The classic statement of logical positivism is ALFRED J. AYER,
LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1946). A thorough account of logical positivism by a legal
scholar, with references to many original sources, may be found in Black, supra, at 616-18.
172 See, e.g., Park, supra note 1, at 851 (characterizing as "legal philistines" scholars who evince
skepticism about the value of social science research to the development of evidence doctrine).
173 For a brief account of the rise and fall of logical positivism, see Rubin, supra note 7, at 1839-
40.
The contemporary American break with logical positivism can be traced to THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). See Paul Horwich, Introduction to WORLD
CHANGES: THOMAS KUHN AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 1 (Paul Horwich ed., 1993) (noting that
until the appearance of Structure, the logical positivist view of science was taken for granted); Farber
& Frickey, supra note 7, at 1629-30 (characterizing Kuhn's Structure as "one of the most influential
books of the past thirty years"). As originally stated, Kuhn's view was that, at any given moment in
time, scientific inquiry is conducted in accordance with a set of widely shared assumptions about the
nature of the world. He called this "normal science." Periodically, a major scientific "revolution"
reorients the scientific community's shared understandings and initiates research in accordance with
them-until another revolution takes place. During periods of "normal" scientific inquiry, it seems
as though scientists are generating "objective" knowledge, but this is an illusion exposed by the next
revolution. Kuhn identified Einstein's theory of relativity as a revolution that replaced an under-
standing of the world based upon Newtonian physics.
The particulars of Kuhn's philosophy have attracted wide attention during the thirty years since
the publication of Structure. Horwich, supra, at 1 ("Kuhn's radical views have been the focus of
much debate not only by philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science but also by large num-
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scientific method necessarily encompasses a multitude of value-laden
judgments that affect the outcome of research. For example, the initial
decision to study a particular phenomenon is based upon subjective judg-
ments concerning the importance of that phenomenon relative to all
others.174 The collection and categorization of data are similarly subjec-
tive enterprises. Finally, the interpretation of data is also inherently
value laden. Data can be used to explain an infinite number of hypothe-
ses; choosing the "most plausible" hypothesis is simply not an objective
endeavor.175
Social science research places especially great strains on the objec-
tivity of the scientific method because, by definition, it involves the study
of human behavior.176 Social scientists usually choose between two
methods of scientific inquiry: field research or laboratory study. Inher-
ent in each of these methods are shortcomings that jeopardize the purity
or "objectivity" of the results. When doing field research, the social sci-
entist loses control over the multitude of variables upon which human
behavior might depend. As a result, interpretation of data from field
study is tricky because the social scientist must make essentially subjec-
tive judgments regarding whether and to what extent the data have been
influenced by uncontrolled factors. In the language of social scientists,
field study presents serious problems of "internal validity." 177
bers of practicing scientists."). Mucl of the commentary on Kuhnian philosophy has been critical.
See, eg., TOULMIN, supra note 43, at 100-30 (1971). As a result, Kuhn has refined and perhaps
redefined his original views. See id. at 107-17; Horwich, supra, at 5 ("Needless to say, Kuhn's
philosophy of science has not remained fixed since the first edition of Structure. Ideas have been
clarified, misreadings corrected, emphases shifted."); Thomas S. Kuhn, Afterword to WORLD
CHANGES, supra, at 314 (setting forth "what my position has become in the years since Structure").
For my purposes, the important point is that logical positivism has not survived Kuhn's prag-
matic attack; the continuing debate within the community of philosophers of science is over the
contours and implications of a pragmatic approach. See Horwich, supra, at 2-7 (sketching out issues
raised by Kuhn's approach and how they are investigated by the authors of the other essays in the
volume); TOULMIN, supra note 43, at 149-55 (setting forth his own essentially pragmatic version of
the philosophy of science).
174 See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the
Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1028 (1989) ("Scientists select problems on the
basis of what seems important, and to this extent all science is culture-bound."); Haney, supra note
170, at 189 ("It is axiomatic to psychologists as well as to lawyers that the form of a question in part
determines its answer. The methods used in posing psychological questions similarly exercise a ma-
jor influence over the kind of data that are collected and the information that may be obtained from
them.").
175 See Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury
Behavior, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107, 115 (1979) ("One can, with a little thought, come up with
alternatives to almost any explanation for a result.... [O]ur confidence in the validity of alternative
explanations rests on their plausibility and not their mere existence."); see also Black, supra note 171,
at 618-20; Fineman & Oppie, supra note 167, at 124-27 (discussing biases inherent in social science
research).
176 See Samuel M. Fahr, Why Lawyers Are Dissatisfied with the Social Sciences, 1 WASHBURN L.J.
161, 167 (1961) (noting that the scientific study of human behavior is particularly difficult).
177 See, e.g., Bray & Kerr, supra note 175, at 116 ("Jury research in the field setting maximizes
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Laboratory research in the social scientific realm usually means
placing human subjects in a simulated setting. Through the use of simu-
lations the researcher gains significant control over the variables that
may affect outcomes-but at an equally significant cost. The cost is the
difficulty of applying data obtained in simulated settings to situations in
the real world.178 The researcher must make subjective judgments about
the extent to which differences between the simulated setting and the real
world affect the generalizability of the research. This is the problem of
"external validity."' 179
Not surprisingly, social scientists have developed generally accepted
methods for managing the problems of research validity and data inter-
pretation. Ideally, studies are designed to minimize validity problems
given the limitations inherent in any methodology and restricted by prac-
tical considerations such as funding and time.'80 Once a study is com-
pleted, the results are reported in an article that conforms to a standard
format: the initial hypothesis, methodology, and results must be fully set
forth so as to facilitate critical evaluation by others in the field. A discus-
sion section sets out the researcher's interpretation of her data.' 8 '
realism but sacrifices experimental control."); see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social
Authority: Obtaining Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
501-05 (1986) (discussing the issues that commonly arise in connection with internal validity: selec-
tion bias, "history," and "maturation").
178 See Bray & Kerr, supra note 175, at 116 ("Ulse of the standard unrealistic simulation buys
control, opportunity to observe deliberations, and affordability, but at a cost of realism.").
179 See, e g., id. at 107-15 (criticizing jury simulations on external validity grounds, though ex-
pressing cautious optimism about the informational value of many mock jury findings); Tapp, supra
note 161, at 177-79 (discussing the serious external validity problems associated with experiments
using mock juries); Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation
Paradigm, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979) (harshly criticizing jury simulations in part on exter-
nal validity grounds, although concluding that the methodological problems are not insurmounta-
ble); Monahan & Loftus, supra note 161, at 459 ("There can be little doubt that the bedrock
methodological issue confronting the psychology of law in the 1980s is the external validity of labo-
ratory simulations."); id. at 459-61 (reviewing literature regarding issue of external validity); Meehl,
supra note 126, at 76-77, 90-95 (reviewing the problem of external validity and concluding that
"when we generalize from laboratory research ... the situation is extraordinarily complex and few
statements can be made unqualifiedly.").
If one doubts the subjective nature by which the external validity of research results is mea-
sured, one need only examine the relevant social science literature. For instance, Bray and Kerr
point out that "one can always identify differences (if only temporal) between any study and the
settings to which it is intended to generalize. But in the absence of direct empirical comparison, our
confidence in a result's external validity depends upon whether it is plausible that such differences
limit its generality in the light of what else we know." Bray & Kerr, supra note 175, at 115.
180 See, eg., Monahan & Walker, supra note 177, at 503 ("Social scientists design their studies to
minimize any factors that could compromise validity and make the results of the research equivocal
or 'poorly reasoned.' "); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as
Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877, 886 (1988) ("A research design can be thought of as the
blueprint of an empirical investigation. Researchers design their methods of collecting data to yield
a true (or 'valid') estimate of some state of the world.").
181 See, e.g., MIRIAM SCHAPIRO GROSOF & HYMAN SARDY, A RESEARCH PRIMER FOR THE
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 381-403 (1985) (specifying and discussing the three main parts
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Even if designed with the maximum of care, a single experiment
does not yield conclusive results. Rather, the extent to which scientific
research adds to the existing body of knowledge is the product of a sub-
jective process that ends with consensus in the scientific community. Ar-
ticles setting forth the results of research are subjected to "peer review";
that is, they are thoroughly examined by other scientists before they are
even published. Once published, the research is, of course, critically
evaluated by members of the relevant scientific community.' 8 2 In most
instances, results are not accepted as true until they have been confirmed
by other independent research, preferably research with an alternative
design. 183
Thus understood, scientific knowledge is not objective fact; rather, it
is the product of discourse within the scientific community. This dis-
course occurs within generally accepted parameters; significant deviation
from the norm will almost surely result in the rejection of one's research.
Moreover, knowledge is acquired by consensus, which may be disturbed
or displaced completely by later study. 84
Rejection of logical positivism and recognition of the true nature
of scientific inquiry places evidence scholars' ever-increasing reliance on
social science research in a new light. The use of social science data to
support or defend proposals concerning the shape of evidence doctrine
amounts to nothing more than the displacement of one subjective
discourse (i.e., legal reasoning) for another (i.e., social scientific
methodology).18 5
This conclusion about the value of social science research to evi-
dence scholars can be stated yet another way. As noted above, reliance
of a report of social scientific research: the problem statement, the methodology, and the results);
GEORGE W. FAIRWEATHER & Louis G. TORNATZKY, EXPERIMENTAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL
POLICY RESEARCH 377-79 (1977) (describing the proper manner of publishing experimental results,
specifically stating that the article "should present a clear description of the sample... ; a clear and
lucid description of the models including all roles; a description of the internal processes and the
external processes; comparisons of the models on the social change and other outcome criteria; a
presentation of relationship and process analyses; and, finally, a description of all phases of the
research").
182 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 177, at 500-01 ("The publication of research in refereed
journals, or in books that have professional editorial boards, is an important indication of the weight
that social scientists will accord a finding.").
183 Id. at 508 ("The trustworthiness of a study increases as independent investigators arrive at a
common conclusion.").
184 In the language of pragmatism, scientific inquiry is simply one example of a scholarly practice.
See Rubin, supra note 7, at 1842-45.
185 See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty,
and Ronald Dworkin, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 47, 59 (Michael Brint & William
Weaver eds., 1991) ("The advocate or jurist who moves from the conceptual apparatus in law to the
apparatus of statistical methods and behaviorist psychology has not exchanged the perspective-spe-
cific facts of an artificial discursive system for the real, unvarnished facts; rather, he or she has
exchanged the facts emergent in one discursive system-one contestable articulation of the world-
for the facts emergent in another.").
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upon social scientific data in evaluating law reform necessitates the appli-
cation of scientific findings to real world legal settings. Determining
whether research results are generalizable between places and over
time-that is, overcoming the problem of external validity-requires the
use of reasoning techniques that include analogy, imagination, common
sense, experience, and induction. These are the very methods of practical
reason. In other words, applied social science, though a positive en-
deavor, is-at least at some stages-predominately an exercise in practi-
cal reason. 186
An illustration of this point can be found in Demeanor. Professor
Wellborn faces squarely the problem of assessing the extent to which re-
sults from laboratory studies provide insight into the ability of jurors to
make use of demeanor evidence in the courtroom. He begins his analysis
by noting the strength of the analogy between the two settings: "Court-
rooms have more in common with laboratories than with 'real life.'
Courtroom testimony, like respondent interviews in the experiments, is
nonspontaneous, highly structured, self-conscious, and public."' 8 7 He
then identifies the primary differences between the laboratory and the
courtroom: "context, cross-examination, deliberation, and [witness]
preparation."188 Although he notes that more research is needed regard-
ing the significance of these differences, he nevertheless argues that they
do not affect the experiments' generalizability. In so doing, he relies
upon a variety of practical techniques, including common sense, prece-
dent, and authority.189
186 This is simply another way of stating the point made above: scientific methodology is not
objective. Scientific inquiry always involves techniques of practical reason to one degree or another.
The application of social science research to law reform is, however, a place where "nonscientific"
(Le., practical) techniques are of particular importance. It is also of particular relevance to the
subject matter of this article.
A semantic clarification might be necessary here. Professor Burton would, I think, take excep-
tion to my characterization of applied social science as an exercise of practical reason. He defines
practical reason as applying only to endeavors that are primarily normative, a category into which
applied social science does not fit. My use of the term "practical reason" is closer to that of Judge
Posner: it includes the methods by which people make both normative and positive decisions in
everyday life. See supra note 131.
187 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1079.
188 Id.
189 On the issue of context, Professor Wellborn argues that, compared to a discrete simulated
event, the nature of a real trial-involving the presentation of successive witnesses in an adversarial
setting-probably makes it even more difficult for factfinders to process demeanor evidence, and he
cites to a similar comment by Professor Edward H. Cooper. See id. at 1080 & n.16. Regarding
cross-examination, Professor Wellborn invokes the authority of McCormick for the proposition that
cross-examination is more likely to make the weak or timid witness out to be a liar, as opposed to the
rogue. See id. at 1080-81. Addressing the issue of deliberation, Professor Wellborn argues essen-
tially from common sense that, even if some jurors were better at interpreting demeanor evidence
than others, there is no reason to believe that their superior judgment would prevail. See id. at 1081.
Finally, on the issue of witness preparation, Professor Wellborn uses precedent (the words of Profes-
sor Applegate) and another common sense argument: that coaching, by making the lying witness
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The strength of Professor Wellborn's ultimate conclusion-that de-
meanor evidence is worthless-is dependent not only upon the strength
of the relevant social scientific data, but also upon the persuasiveness of
his practical arguments concerning the application of this data to the
courtroom setting. This proves an essential point. Because applied so-
cial science necessarily involves the use of practical reason, it provides
answers to questions related to law reform that are, on average, no more
authoritative than answers derived from other techniques of practical
reason.190 This does not mean, of course, that the results of social scien-
tific study are not sometimes appropriately regarded as definitive. Just
like answers derived from other processes of practical reason, answers
supplied by the application of social science to law will appear to be con-
clusive to the extent that they command a consensus among interested
observers. 191
Having reached the conclusion that applied social science is merely
one form of practical reason, an evaluation of evidence scholars' increas-
ing devotion to empirical research is now possible. This issue is taken up
in the next section.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Social Science Research
The theoretical value of social scientific inquiry to the reform of evi-
dence law is obvious. Each normative decision about evidence doctrine
is necessarily grounded in a multitude of assumptions about the empiri-
cal world. Social scientific research is a discourse devoted to developing
increasingly refined consensuses concerning the nature of empirical real-
ity. When research produces a new consensus relevant to the law of evi-
dence, scholars can advocate appropriate doctrinal modifications and
pride themselves on being champions of progress.
Indeed, this rosy scenario is not foreign to the history of evidence
scholarship. For instance, empirical study has played a key role in the
development of contemporary attitudes toward the admission of expert
testimony on the issue of eyewitness identification. Decades of research
more sure of himself (and possibly by causing him to believe his lies), is likely to reduce rather than
enhance the efficacy of demeanor evidence. See id at 1081-82.
190 Professor Meehl made a similar observation a generation ago. Meehl, supra note 126, at 77
("Without denigrating [social scientific] data [regarding the deterrent effect of swift and certain pun-
ishment], I cannot say that they are clearly more persuasive than introspection and the (remarkably
uniform) anecdotes about the Scandinavian drunk-driving sanctions.").
Although the context is quite different, Professors Walker and Monahan have also noted the
similarity between the practical endeavors of law and applied social science. See Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. Rav. 559, 590-91
(1987) (concluding that in assessing social scientific research, courts can evaluate the scientific data
"along dimensions analogous to the ... criteria used to evaluate precedent").
191 Cf Meehl, supra note 126, at 95-97 (noting that decisions in the law will inevitably be based
upon a combination of "fireside inductions" and social science data, depending upon judgments
regarding the strength of each).
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persuaded a critical mass of legal actors, including scholars, that many
common intuitions about eyewitness testimony-for instance, that stress
increases accuracy-run contrary to empirical fact. 192 As a result, the
law has undergone reform. 93
The example of eyewitness identification, however, is the exception
rather than the rule. As a general matter, normative judgments about
evidence doctrine are relatively impervious to changes in empirical un-
derstandings. Despite oft-repeated lamentations to the contrary, this is
not primarily the result of legal academics' unwillingness or inability to
master the nuances of social scientific discourse. 194 Nor is it due to social
scientists' naivete regarding legal processes-though that is sometimes a
problem.' 95 Rather, social science has had minimal impact on the re-
form of evidence doctrine because, contrary to common perceptions, so-
cial scientific study does not simplify legal problems or provide easy
answers to legally relevant empirical questions. Social scientific data are
meaningless unless they survive the processes of practical reason; that is,
unless and until the evidence community reaches a consensus that (1) a
given interpretation of the scientific data yields an accurate empirical de-
piction of reality and (2) this interpretation affects an assumption under-
lying legal doctrine in a particular way.
Consensus on these two points is a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for empirical data to result in doctrinal change. In addition, the
evidence community's new consensus about empirical reality must trans-
late into an altered view of the efficacy of the doctrine itself. This is not
likely in the short term because the configuration of any particular facet
of evidence doctrine, if properly analyzed as the product of practical rea-
son, is unlikely to rest upon a single normative justification. Rather, it is
192 See Loh, supra note 157, at 679-91 (reviewing the literature concerning the psychology of
eyewitness identification testimony).
193 See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230-32 (3d Cir. 1985) (reviewing the
cases and concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification can be helpful evidence).
194 See, e.g., Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Some Limits on the Application of Social Science Research in
the Legal Process, 5 LAW & Soc. ORD. 815, 824 (1973) ("The single most important barrier to the
use of social science research in the practice of law is ignorance."); Meehl, supra note 126, at 67
(describing lawyer who refused to acknowledge value of social scientific research to the law); Kalven,
supra note 160, at 58 (arguing that "we in the legal world need some literacy as to scientific
method"). But see Walker & Monahan, supra note 190, at 589 (noting that they are "more san-
guine" about the ability of legal actors, specifically judges, to evaluate the validity of empirical
claims); Monahan & Walker, supra note 177, at 511 n. 119 (arguing that acquiring sophistication in
social science is not more difficult than tackling difficult legal problems: "Anyone who can compre-
hend the Federal Tort Claims Act can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance
mean.").
195 See, e.g., Meehl, supra note 126, at 70-71 (criticizing the "fuzzy-headedness" of some social
scientists addressing legal issues); Haney, supra note 170, at 167 ("[P]sychologists have perfected no
methodology (or technology) by which laboratory findings can be translated into real-world applica-
tions. They typically avoid-and are therefore often naive about-the power struggles that precede
policy change.").
1040
88:995 (1994) Modern Evidence Scholarship
(or should be) based on a web of beliefs, each providing separate support
for the doctrinal choice. 196 In contrast, social scientific research, if faith-
ful to its discourse, is narrowly focused; social scientists can examine
only one or two empirical assumptions at any given time. Thus, the re-
sults of social scientific study typically call into question only one strand
within any given web of beliefs, leaving the other justifications for the
doctrine intact. A change of consensus about the empirical world, there-
fore, will not necessarily translate into a change of consensus about legal
doctrine. 197
Furthermore, it is often difficult or impossible to pinpoint a singular
empirical assumption underlying any given strand of belief. Research
that misses the mark will be of little use. Consider, for example, the
recent social scientific studies examining the rule against hearsay. 198
These studies attempt to measure the ability of jurors to recognize hear-
say and to discount its value in light of its derivative status. Their results
are consistent: contrary to the assumption underlying hearsay doctrine,
jurors appear to be very capable of identifying and devaluing hearsay
evidence. 199 Although all the researchers are careful to stress the tenta-
tive nature of their results,200 they all ultimately claim that their empiri-
196 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 348 (explaining the pragmatic view that "[w]e all
accept a number of different values and propositions that, taken together, constitute a web of inter-
twined beliefs .... Decisionmaking is, therefore, polycentric, and thus cannot be linear or purely
deductive. Instead it is spiral and inductive: We consider the consistency of the evidence for each
value before reaching a final decision, and even then check our decision against the values we esteem
the most.").
197 Cf Kalven, supra note 160, at 68 (noting the difficulty in pinning down a legal premise for
testing because "[1]egal rules and especially legal institutions do not have a single avowed end or
purpose against which their performance can be tidily measured").
We have already seen this phenomenon with respect to Professor Wellborn's analysis of de-
meanor evidence and Professor Tanford's critique of limiting instructions. Even if one accepts the
validity of the social scientific data on which they rely, and one accepts the applicability of the
simulations to the real world of the courtroom-neither inconsequential matters--one's view of evi-
dence doctrine is not likely to change. This is because in both cases the social scientific research calls
into question only one justification for the doctrine. But other justifications of the doctrine remain.
In the case of demeanor evidence, there is the prophylactic effect of live testimony and the nonratio-
nalist values served by live trials. In the case of limiting instructions, there is the nonrationalist
value of preserving a sense of closure, coupled with the inability to start a case over every time an
attorney or witness makes reference to inadmissible evidence.
198 See Miene et al., supra note 2; Kovera et al., supra note 2; Landsman & Rakos, supra note 166.
199 Miene et al., supra note 2, at 699 ("[T]he data from this study suggests that hearsay as a form
of testimony is not overvalued by jurors ...."); Kovera et al., supra note 2, at 719 ("[J]uries rely
more heavily on eyewitness testimony than hearsay testimony."); Landsman & Rakos, supra note
166, at 76 ("[-]earsay that was not highlighted as inappropriate, and that was introduced within the
context of a substantial volume of other evidence, appeared to exert minimal influence on the ulti-
mate outcome of the trial.").
200 Miene et al., supra note 2, at 699 ("The fact that subjects in this study did not give much
weight to hearsay evidence does not conclusively make the case for hearsay reform."); Kovera et al.,
supra note 2, at 722 ("This article addresses only one of the many issues underlying calls for hearsay
reform."); Landsman & Rakos, supra note 166, at 77 ("The preliminary findings described [in the
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cal data provide more than minimal support for the abolition or
amendment of the rule against hearsay. 201
The empirical findings, however, provide considerably less support
for reform than even these cautious researchers suggest. None of the
studies addresses the fact that hearsay evidence never appears at trial in
some neutral manner. Rather, like all other evidence, hearsay statements
are offered by a party, presumably for some particular reason. Some-
times a skillful trial lawyer will use hearsay to camouflage a weakness in
her case; sometimes it will be the only available evidence on point; some-
times it will be the best evidence to prove its assertive content.20 2 By
failing to measure the ability of jurors to evaluate hearsay evidence in
light of the reasons a party might be offering it, the recent social scientific
research is not likely to cast serious doubt on the usefulness of the hear-
say rule.
The foregoing discussion of the limited benefits to be derived from
social science inquiry has assumed the internal validity of the social sci-
entific studies at issue. Unfortunately, this assumption is probably inac-
curate; the social scientific studies relied upon in legal literature are often
seriously flawed. That this is so despite decades of literature critiquing
social scientific methods, particularly as they have been applied to the
law, is especially troubling. The benefit of social scientific research to the
process of law reform is, of course, correspondingly reduced.
Examples of evidence scholars relying upon social scientific studies
plagued by internal validity problems abound. Professor Wellborn relies
on several studies of this type in Demeanor. Although purporting to
measure the ability of individuals to detect others' deception from facial
and body language, at least half of the studies cited by Professor Well-
article] are provocative.... No reevaluation [of the hearsay rule], however, should be undertaken
on the strength of one or two preliminary experiments.").
201 See Miene et a]., supra note 2, at 700 ("At the very least, this study has significant policy
implications for cases in which an appellate court must decide whether the reception of hearsay...
constituted reversible error. Ifjurors in fact give little or no credence to hearsay evidence, then the
admission of hearsay.., should be treated as harmless error."); Kovera et al., supra note 2, at 722
(claiming that the study's findings "provide some empirical support for the notion that the legal
system should provide jurors with any information that may assist them in resolving the case, includ-
ing hearsay evidence"); Landsman & Rakos, supra note 166, at 77 ("If correct, [the study's findings]
signal a strong argument for the reevaluation of the hearsay rule.").
To their credit, Professors Landsman and Rakos published a later version of their hearsay arti-
cle in which they did not succumb to overstatement regarding the importance of their empirical data
to the viability of the hearsay rule. Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hear-
say Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
In this article, they examine the limitations of empirical research and discuss strategies for maximiz-
ing its success. See id. at 654-76. But they conclude by overestimating the importance of social
scientific study to the enterprise of law reform yet again, this time by suggesting that hearsay doc-
trine should remain unchanged until the completion of a comprehensive program of empirical re-
search. Id. at 677; see infra text accompanying note 209.
202 See Seigel, supra note 13, at 916-24, 928-38.
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born did not involve a face-to-face confrontation between witness and
liar. Instead, these studies used witnesses who viewed videotapes. 20 3
More important, in all the experiments, the individuals who lied were
either role playing or were placed in a setting in which lying was clearly
an appropriate behavior.204 As a result, none of the studies in fact mea-
sured the ability of human subjects to detect deception when the liar
fears exposure, which is surely what they were trying to assess.
The authors of the three hearsay studies referenced above 0 5 make a
similar mistake. None of these studies made use of live witnesses; their
"eyewitness testimony" took the form of either a videotape or tran-
script.20 6 Thus, although each of the studies purports to examine the
ability of human subjects to differentiate and discount hearsay in com-
parison with witness testimony, they actually measure individuals' abili-
ties to differentiate among different types of hearsay and hearsay within
hearsay. Remarkably, the articles are silent on this critical issue con-
cerning their internal design. 207
Social scientific research is thus much less useful than evidence
scholars commonly imagine. It certainly is not a panacea. Rarely does it
narrow the area of debate surrounding the advisability of doctrinal re-
form; on the contrary, it usually raises even more issues--concerning the
validity, interpretation, and impact of the empirical data-than it re-
solves. In addition, to the extent that some legal scholars employ such
research without a sufficiently critical attitude and others accept it be-
cause of its scientific status, empirical evidence is as likely to lead to det-
rimental doctrinal outcomes as to beneficial ones.208 Thus, the misuse of
social scientific research can be costly.
Unwarranted faith in the efficacy of social scientific evidence can
203 Wellborn, supra note 18, at 1082-88. I invite those readers who fail to see the difference
between a face-to-face confrontation and a review of a videotaped performance to recall the remarka-
bly different impact a play has when it is viewed in the theater compared to when it is videotaped
and watched on television.
204 In one of the studies, for instance, the "liars" were contestants on the television show "To Tell
the Truth"; in another, the "liars" were police academy students who were instructed to lie under
the pretense that good police officers must sometimes lie in the line of duty (presumably referring to
undercover investigative work). See id.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
206 See Miene et al., supra note 2, at 689-91 (describing the use of videotaped testimony in the
design of their experiment); Kovera et al., supra note 2, at 707-10 (same); Rakos & Landsman, supra
note 201, at 657-64 (describing the use of transcripts in the design of their experiment).
207 Even in their later article, Professors Rakos and Landsman fail to notice that "videotaped
presentations" are hearsay. Rakos & Landsman, supra note 201, at 673 (discussing the need to use
videotaped presentations-rather than written transcripts-in future simulations).
I do not intend to pass judgment on the degree to which this characteristic of the recent re-
search on hearsay lessens the validity of its results, if it does so at all. My point is that it is impossi-
ble to assess the value of this research without confronting this issue.
208 Cf. Meehl, supra note 126, at 88 (noting that "reliance on... fireside inductions may yield
better results than the intermediate level sophistication which knows enough to ask a psychologist's
or psychiatrist's opinion, but does not know enough to take what he says cum grano sails").
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also lead to an extremely conservative attitude toward doctrinal reform.
Indeed, some evidence scholars have argued that reform should not be
undertaken unless it is fully supported by empirical study.20 9 The status
of applied social science as one of many methods of practical reason mili-
tates against delaying dialogue and experimentation until a program of
scientific study is complete.
The greatest cost resulting from the increasing tendency of evidence
scholars to turn to empirical study, however, is probably the opportunity
cost, that is, the cost of expending so much of the evidence community's
finite resources on unpromising endeavors. Without question, social sci-
entific research is time consuming and costly. Such research certainly
ought not to be terminated, but evidence scholars should employ it with
a full understanding of its limitations and potential for abuse. 210
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article is not the first to start from the premise that modem
evidence scholarship has been, in at least some respects, uninteresting
and ineffective. Richard Lempert made the now well-known (and per-
haps infamous) comment that, since the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, too many articles have followed the model, "What's Wrong
209 See, e.g., Rakos & Landsman, supra note 201, at 677 ("In the hearsay setting... [nlothing
should be done until experimental work reveals that the admission of hearsay poses little threat to
the actual or perceived integrity of jury deliberation.").
210 In general, I agree with Professor Rubin's assessment that, if scholars reach a sufficient point
of self-awareness, through which they directly confront and justify their normative positions in a
systematic manner, they will be able to "make more extensive, but more controlled use of empirical
data." Rubin, supra note 7, at 1896. I also believe, however, that for empirical study to benefit legal
scholarship, legal scholars who develop programs of empirical research must adopt some of the
salutary practices of social scientists. For instance, they should plan long-term strategies of empiri-
cal inquiry rather than employ the hit-or-miss approach so prevalent today. More importantly, they
should report the findings of empirical studies in short articles focusing solely on the research and its
results and not in long-winded articles setting forth (often unjustified) expositions of the implications
of the data. Such a paradigm shift in legal scholarship would undoubtedly require a change in the
tenure requirements of most law schools (which typically recognize only long and exhaustively foot-
noted textual articles as tenure pieces) and perhaps a partial abandonment of student-edited law
reviews. It might also require, I think, the development of masters degree programs in the field of
"empirical legal studies" so that law professors who were so inclined could be adequately trained in
law-related social scientific methodology and discourse. But see id. at 1898-1900 (indicating that
legal scholars could set the agenda but rely on independent social scientists to carry out the empirical
research).
In the case of evidence scholarship, the inevitability of external validity problems engendered by
the use of simulated experiments raises a serious question about the value of even the most carefully
planned course of empirical study. Upon careful reflection, evidence scholars might conclude that
the persuasiveness of empirical research depends on the corroboration of simulated findings with
results from controlled experimentation in the field. This will require the scholarly community to
persuade judges that such field experimentation is worthwhile and can be accomplished without
harm to real world participants in the adjudicatory process. Currently, the notion of using field
study to examine the efficacy of evidence doctrine is generally disregarded.
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With the Twenty-Ninth Exception to the Hearsay Rule and How the
Addition of Three Words Can Correct the Problem. ' 211 Professor
Lempert, however, expressed optimism about what he described as the
transformation of evidence from "a field concerned with the articulation
of rules to a field concerned with the process of proof."212 He saw re-
demption in the "new evidence scholarship" that was beginning to focus
on this latter subject. At roughly the same time, other evidence scholars
turned to empirical research for redemption from the tedium of narrow
and dry doctrinal analysis.
This Article is, of course, considerably less sanguine about these re-
cent developments in evidence scholarship. It has demonstrated that
even "interesting" evidence scholarship has been consistently distorted
by the twin vices of foundationalism and logical positivism. The Article
thus seeks to initiate an exchange within the community of evidence
scholars that will result in the displacement of foundationalism and logi-
cal positivism with pragmatism and practical reason. Such an intellec-
tual shift would help scholars avoid misuses of empirical data in arguing
for evidence reform. Even more important, it would cause members of
the academy to devote more of their finite cognitive resources to robust
practical discourse regarding the optimal shape of evidence doctrine.
The success of this Article will depend upon the extent to which
others in the field heed this call rather than condemn or ignore it. In
other words, the pragmatic measure of the value of this Article, like most
others, will be whether it facilitates dialogue and withstands the test of
time.
211 Lempert, supra note 13, at 439.
212 Id.
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